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ABSTRACT
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Under the Supervision of Professor Scott Drewianka

The goal of this dissertation is to apply theoretical and empirical methodologies used
in the field of labor economics to analyze several topics which have clear policy
implications.
Chapter 1 analyzes the relationship between domestic violence and welfare receipt in
a more rigorous framework than has been previously possible. It is well documented
that there is a strong relationship between abuse and welfare receipt and the
assumption has predominantly been that welfare receipt affects the risk of
victimization. I show that the direction of impact actually runs in the opposite
direction. This finding is critical in light of the welfare reforms of the 1990’s. I find
that violence decreased the likelihood of using welfare services prior to the reforms,
and that this effect is even larger after the reforms took place. However, this negative
effect is drastically reduced in the presence of the Family Violence Option.
Chapter 2 broadens the analysis of domestic violence to include women of all income
levels. Specifically, I look at how the decision to participate in the workforce affects
abuse levels and vice versa. Because attitudes towards domestic violence and
women’s working status likely vary by income levels, I analyze the relationship in
both low and high income households. I find that for women with low income
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spouses, employment increases the likelihood of abuse, however, for women with
high income spouses, employment decreases the likelihood of abuse.
Chapter 3 attempts to reconcile the observed educational attainment gap between
black and white workers with the monetary returns to education literature which
predicts that black individuals have higher monetary incentives to invest. I examine
the returns to education in a broader sense: the job satisfaction returns to education. I
find that job satisfaction is actually declining in education for black workers. Further,
it is found that education does not improve the ability of black workers to transition
into new jobs that they like better. These results suggest that higher education may
create expectations that are not being met by black workers, and one potential
explanation for this is that covert discrimination still exists in the workplace.
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Chapter 1: “Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Determining the Nature of
the Relationship in the Pre- and Post -Welfare Reform Eras”

Introduction
The welfare system has the potential to provide women in low income
households who are victims of domestic violence with the resources necessary to
become self-sufficient and ultimately enable them to leave their abusive partners. It is
because of this potential use of the welfare system that advocates for domestic
violence victims were concerned about the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [1996]),
which dramatically changed the structure of the welfare system. Among the changes
that took place were a reduction in the length of time that individuals and households
could receive benefits and stricter working requirements for receiving aid. The worry
was that these changes would make the system even more inaccessible to abused
women and reduce their outside options (Hetling [2000]). An optional provision
called the Family Violence Option (FVO) was proposed because of this concern,
which would allow states that adopted it to waive some of the requirements of the
program for individuals who identified themselves as victims of abuse. Because of the
potential policy implications, it is thus critical to understand the relationship between
domestic violence and welfare receipt.
It is well documented that there is a significant overlap between women who
are victims of abuse and women who are recipients of welfare assistance. In 1992 the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy’s “Family Income Study” found that 60
percent of AFDC recipients were also victims of domestic abuse. However, there are
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currently many aspects of this relationship that are not understood. Among the
questions are whether the act of receiving welfare has an effect on domestic violence
levels, if violence has an effect on welfare take-up, or if both are due to unobserved
factors. Underlying much of the analysis is a lack of understanding of the motives
behind the use of domestic violence. Is violence, for example, used as an instrument
to deter certain behaviors?
Most of the existing literature has assumed that welfare receipt affects
domestic violence rates, though other theoretical models offer competing views of the
relationship. In one view, welfare receipt may provoke violence because it may be
seen as an act of defiance and an attempt to leave (see Raphael and Tolman [1997] for
example), or, as Kurz (1989) suggests, it may deter violence because the woman has
gained more bargaining power in the relationship and the spouse or partner does not
want to lose those additional resources. Alternatively, domestic violence may push a
woman into welfare possibly because she is no longer able to hold a job, or perhaps as
a means to gather resources to leave the relationship. These two variables may also
affect each other simultaneously.
Thus far the empirical literature has not reached a consensus as to the sign and
the direction of the relationship. This owes largely to the fact that data have been
severely limited. Ideally the dataset should be nationally representative, have
individual level data on both welfare receipt and domestic violence, and span a period
of time that includes both the pre and post reform eras. Various studies have used data
that satisfy some of these conditions, but none have been able to satisfy all of them.
This paper examines the empirical relationship between domestic violence and
welfare receipt. One of its main contributions is to take a theoretically agnostic
approach and test multiple theoretical models of the relationship instead of assuming
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one particular model. To do so, it uses data from the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH) that contains individual-level data on both domestic violence and
welfare receipt. Although this data has been used in several previous studies of
domestic violence, until now it has not been utilized to analyze its relationship with
welfare receipt. The dataset also allows for the relationship to be studied using
appropriate estimation techniques that allow for potential mutual dependence between
the two variables, and its timing enables us to evaluate how the relationship changed
after the reforms took place. Ultimately we reject the model previously assumed in the
literature and find that the direction of causality is the opposite of what was supposed.
In particular, domestic violence is found to have a strong negative effect on welfare
receipt, which is at odds with the positive correlation that is typically found in the
sociology literature but consistent with some of the findings of the economics
literature.
This finding is troubling because it has negative implications for the effect of
the welfare reforms on abused women. If women viewed the welfare system as being
inaccessible because of their circumstances even before the reforms took place, the
changes to the welfare system would make it even less likely for women to use
welfare as a means to leave abusive relationships. While the presence of the FVO is
found to significantly increase the likelihood that an abused woman will go on
welfare, it does not completely eliminate the negative impact of abuse on welfare
receipt. This suggests that further policy changes are necessary if welfare is to be
considered a means for escaping abuse. Possible solutions may be to increase the
amount of aid that victims can receive, making the FVO mandatory for every state,
and increasing the number of programs aimed at helping women become selfsufficient that are available.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 1 discusses the
relevant legislative history and empirical literature, section 2 presents several
hypothesized relationships between welfare and domestic violence and proposes a
method for selecting between empirical models, section 3 describes the data used,
section 4 details the model selection process, section 5 presents the results, and
section 6 concludes.

1. Background
1.1 Legislative History
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (P.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [1996]) was motivated by a growing concern
about the dependency of welfare-receiving poor. The law instituted the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program to replace the Aid for Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). The main goal was to make welfare a transition to work
so that families could ultimately become self-sufficient. Major provisions included
imposing stricter work requirements, limiting the lifetime benefits that households can
receive, providing aid to families transitioning to work, and allowing states to use
funds that would have gone to welfare checks to create public jobs or to provide
hiring incentives to potential employers (Administration for Children and Families,
1996).
Specifically, the law stated that families could receive welfare payments for a
maximum of two consecutive years before they must enter the workforce. Many states
chose even narrower time frames for assistance. These welfare benefits could be
renewed at a later date, but the lifetime maximum number of years was limited to only
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five cumulative years. The law also increased the amount of aid given to families for
child care by $3.5 billion in order to allow mothers to transition into the workforce
more easily. Finally, the law allowed states greater liberty to use their funds for other
initiatives aimed at increasing employment such as using part of their funds to create
jobs for welfare recipients.
One concern that arose was that victims of domestic violence may not be able
to meet the new TANF workforce participation requirement, either because physical
signs of abuse may be a hindrance to employment or because the level of violence
may escalate if the woman chooses to participate in the program. In response, the
Family Violence Option (FVO) was created to provide temporary exemptions to the
TANF requirements for victims of domestic violence or those at risk of such violence
(Legal Momentum [2004]). This concern demonstrates the importance of this study: a
proper policy response requires a clear understanding of the relationship between
welfare and abuse.
1.2 Literature
This relationship garnered much attention particularly after the reforms of
1996. Prior studies of the relationship have been primarily of a theoretical nature, and
data limitations have heretofore restricted most empirical studies to calculating
correlations between welfare receipt and domestic violence. A few have modeled the
relationship, but only by assuming a particular direction of causality—that welfare
receipt affects domestic violence rates.
The earliest correlation studies found a very strong positive correlation
between welfare receipt and domestic violence (see “The Worcester Family Research
Project” or “The Effects of Violence on Women’s Employment” for example). These
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early studies were very limited in their analysis largely because of the nature of the
data that was used. Datasets were typically constrained to a small region of the U.S.,
and many were limited only to women who were on welfare or were victims of abuse.
It was thus not clear whether the higher prevalence of domestic violence among
welfare recipients was because these women come from low-income households that
tend to be more violent, because the simple act of receiving welfare is interpreted by
an abuser as an act of defiance and an attempt to leave the relationship, because
domestic violence motivates women to enter the welfare system in order to gain the
necessary resources to leave, or because victims are no longer able to work.
Several studies have since emerged that attempt to get at the causal
relationship between domestic violence and welfare. Even before the 1996 welfare
reforms, Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) examined data from interviews with 125
women in Santa Barbara County, California who had been physically abused by their
partners in 1982 and 1983 and found women who received larger AFDC benefits
experienced fewer violent incidents, which stands in contrast to the simpler
correlation studies.
Nou and Timmins (2005) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler (2003) find the
opposite relationship, consistent with the results of the basic studies discussed above.
These studies improved upon previous studies in that they used national-level data
and attempted to model the relationship in a way that was previously impossible. Nou
and Timmins examine the relationship at the state level and found that higher
proportions of households receiving welfare corresponded to higher rates of domestic
violence. Farmer and Tiefenthaler found similar results utilizing individual-level data
on domestic violence, but were limited to studying the effects of state-level welfare
variables such as the average monthly welfare payment.
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Clearly data sources that can be used to study this relationship have been
limited thus far and no Economics studies have been able to pinpoint the relationship
between welfare receipt and domestic violence on an individual level. In addition, no
study has yet been able to address the potentially complex relationship between
domestic violence and welfare receipt. The analysis that follows attempts to model
this complex relationship using data from a source new to the Economics literature to
get closer to the true relationship between the two variables.

2. Theory
While the empirical literature has focused primarily on how welfare receipt
affects domestic violence rates, there is good reason to suspect that the relationship is
much more complicated. After all, it also makes sense that domestic violence may
influence a woman’s choice of whether to go on welfare. There are also a number of
other important pieces of information that we do not know.
We don’t know what the male’s objectives are when considering using violence
and if he is more likely to achieve these objectives through violence. Three plausible
goals seem at odds. 1) He may gain utility from keeping the relationship intact, and
thus may use violence to motivate the partner to remain. 2) He also may want to
maintain the dominant position in the household, i.e. have the most bargaining power;
working and/or welfare payments increase the wife’s bargaining power, and if he
feels threatened he may use abuse to prevent it. 3) It is also possible that he wants to
“buy” certain behaviors from her, i.e. if she is doing something of which he doesn’t
approve, he may use violence as an instrument to get her to stop.
Similarly we don’t know what the female’s objectives are when considering
going on welfare. She too may gain utility from keeping the relationship intact and
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pleasing her partner, and she wants to minimize the level of violence, which may
mean not choosing welfare or using welfare as a means of increasing her threat point
and bargaining power. On the other hand, she may go on welfare as a way to acquire
resources that would enable her to leave the relationship.
It is also unclear whether the relationship between domestic violence and
welfare is driven by the actual presence of violence and welfare receipt, or rather by
underlying conditions that are correlated with one or both. To explore the possibilities
more fully, consider the following system of equations:
(1)
(2)
where D* is a latent variable that indicates the underlying state of a relationship, and
D is an indicator that takes a value of 1 (indicating a violent relationship) if

.

W* is a latent variable that represents the temptation to use welfare, and W is an
indicator which takes a value of 1 (indicating receipt of welfare benefits) if

.

X is a vector of variables that influence both violence and welfare receipt, Y a vector
of variables that influence only violence, and Z a vector of variables that influence
only welfare receipt. The error terms

and

may be correlated as well, possibly

because unobserved factors affect both outcomes, which will motivate a bivariate
probit model in the empirical implementation.
This system nests several potential relationships between violence and welfare
receipt. We are particularly interested in the coefficients

,

,

, and

. Each may

or may not be equal to zero, depending on whether the associated mechanism is
empirically relevant.
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2.1 Equation (1): How welfare receipt may affect violence.
Equation (1) suggests that not only the act of receiving welfare, but the
temptation to use welfare as well, can potentially influence whether a woman
experiences abuse. Theory unfortunately does not help us determine how these two
variables might actually affect domestic violence since the direction of causality is
unclear.
For example, if a woman chooses to receive welfare benefits her partner may
respond by either becoming abusive or becoming more abusive (

> 0). Perhaps the

male is abusive to extract some of the money from the welfare benefits, or
alternatively he may feel threatened that his partner’s receipt of welfare may cause an
imbalance in bargaining power, leading him to become violent in order to stop her use
of welfare. Women in these situations likely have very low incomes and thus little
bargaining power in the relationship, so welfare benefits may not give them sufficient
income to leave the relationship. Since the partner feels threatened by her attempt or
meditated attempt to leave, and since he knows that she will not be able to leave if she
persists, he may use abuse to deter her from continuing to receive welfare benefits,
although this strategy may necessitate some sort of transfer payment to the woman to
help support herself. Her marginal utility of consumption is high, so she will forego
some utility from abuse in exchange for more utility from consumption. A similar
logic can be applied to explaining why the temptation to use welfare services might
increase the level of violence in a relationship (

). This is consistent with what

sociologists call “exchange theory” (see Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997], Tauchen,
Witte and Long [1991], and Aizer [2010] for further discussion).
It is also possible that receiving welfare may actually decrease the level of
abuse (

< 0). In this case the women likely have relatively high incomes compared
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to their spouse and thus more bargaining power. If the woman persists in obtaining
the additional income that welfare provides, she would have enough resources to
leave the relationship if she chooses. Her partner also knows this. If her income is
already high, he cannot offer her a transfer payment in exchange for abuse because
her marginal utility of consumption is too low. Since he also wants to keep the
relationship intact (and perhaps to maintain access to her resources), he may choose
low levels of violence or no violence at all. Again, a similar rationale can be applied
to the case where

, only in that case it is the potential welfare payment, rather

than actual receipt, that causes the preemption.
2.2 Equation (2): How violence may affect welfare receipt.
Less often discussed in the literature, Equation (2) suggests that domestic
violence as well as the underlying state of the relationship may influence whether a
woman chooses to receive welfare. Such an effect again may plausibly work in either
direction.
For example, if the underlying state of the relationship is bad (D* is high) or
the relationship is actually abusive (D=1), a woman may choose to go on welfare (
and

> 0). Because adding welfare to her stock of resources may enable her to leave

the relationship if she chooses, she can use welfare or the threat of welfare as a
method of raising her threat point and deterring violence in the future. Or it may be
the case that originally the woman was working and the male felt threatened by it and
used abuse to signal his disapprobation, causing her to withdraw from the workforce
and use welfare to subsist. It is also possible that if the relationship is significantly bad
or abusive, a woman may elect not to receive welfare payments (

and

< 0). For

example, if the abusive spouse does not want the woman to be on welfare, and if
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welfare payments were insufficient to enable her to leave, then abuse may deter the
woman from welfare take-up.
It is also important to note that unobserved factors could also be responsible
for a correlation between domestic violence and welfare receipt, even if
. Indeed, it is possible that the correlation between the two can be nonzero because of a correlation between the two error terms.
2.3 Model Selection Procedure
While some of these proposed mechanisms may seem more valid than others,
none is entirely implausible. Instead of supposing one to be the true model, we take an
agnostic approach to finding the correct specification.
The system of equations cannot be properly estimated with the bivariate probit
model when both

and

are allowed to be non-zero, however we can estimate

different model specifications one by one assuming that either

or

are equal to

zero. When applied to the data, this exercise should tell us which, if any, of the
coefficients of interest are statistically significant and allow us to determine the best
model for analyzing the relationship between violence and welfare receipt. A nice
feature of this estimation strategy is that it also allows welfare receipt and domestic
violence to be related even if

,

,

, and

are all found to be zero through the

correlation between the error terms.
Although the full specification of (1) and (2) cannot be estimated due to the
identification problem noted by Heckman (1978), a simple model selection exercise
can be implemented by assuming different combinations of our key coefficients are
equal to zero. We start by assuming that

implying that actual violence

and actual welfare receipt are not important in the system. We want to test whether
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and

are significant in this model, but since W* and D* are unobservable we

estimate

and

through different combinations of the estimated coefficients. The

reduced form of the model is:
(3)

[(

)

]

(4)

[(

)

]

or for simplicity:
(5)
(6)

where

is equal to

for all X in the D* equation, etc., and

and

are

composite error terms.
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated jointly using a bivariate probit model to
account for possible correlation between the residuals. We then identify:

(7)

̂

(8)

̂

̂

̂

⁄̂

⁄̂

Note that this yields a separate estimate of

for each Z variable, and likewise for

This allows us to test whether each estimate is significant and if the individual
estimates are statistically equal.

.
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2.3.1 Sub-models
Once this baseline model has been run to determine if potential welfare and
violence have any impact, we can begin estimating other models that are also
theoretically valid. One such model assumes that welfare receipt affects domestic
violence, meaning that

is non-zero. This is the model that is typically found in the

literature. In order to estimate this model, we must also assume that

due to

coherency conditions. This gives us the following reduced form model:
(

(9)

)

(10)

Note that if

and

are found to be insignificant, this traditional model simplifies

to:
(11)
(12)

Another model that is possible to estimate reverses the direction of causality
found in the traditional model. This model proposes that domestic violence affects
whether a woman will choose to receive welfare, but that welfare receipt has no
impact on domestic violence. In other words,

is assumed to be non-zero. As with

the traditional model above, we must also impose the restriction that

as a

coherency condition. This gives us the reduced form model:
(13)
(14)

Again, if
the above to:

and

(

)

are found to be zero in the baseline model we can simplify
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(15)
(16)

Likelihood ratio tests between each of the above specifications will help shed light on
which of the three model specifications above is most valid given the data available.

3. Data
The data analyzed come from the National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 13,017 adult respondents
interviewed in three separate waves: 1987-88, 1992-94, and 2001-2003. Unlike the
National Crime Victimization Survey that was examined in previous work, the NSFH
contains information on whether and when the respondent received welfare benefits.
An additional major advantage is that the questions regarding domestic violence are
worded in such a way as to encourage self-reporting1; in contrast, many studies have
been forced to rely on incidents reported to the local police. Furthermore, the timing
of the survey waves allows us both to determine a baseline relationship between
domestic violence and welfare receipt before the welfare reforms and analyze how
that relationship changed post-reform. Considerable information is also available on
the respondent’s family background.
Unfortunately, due to funding issues, geographic information for each
respondent is unavailable in wave 3, so state-level variables (including potential
welfare benefits) for the respondent’s state of residence cannot be included. To

1

Unlike most data sets, this survey does not require that a violent incident be reported to local
authorities making the potential number of incidents reported in the survey higher. The survey question
asked “During the past year, how many fights with your partner resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or
throwing things at you?” This question was then reduced to an indicator variable taking on a value of 1
if there were a positive number of incidents reported.
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address this issue, two separate samples are created using the NSFH dataset. Sample 1
includes data from waves 1 and 2 only and bases state-level variables on the woman’s
current state of residence. Sample 2 includes data from all three waves, but the statelevel variables are based on the respondent’s state of birth.
Both samples are restricted to include only women who are either married or
cohabiting with an intimate partner at the time of the interview as domestic violence
data are not available for other women. In addition, the primary analysis will be
limited to households that have an income below three times the poverty line as very
few households with higher incomes would be eligible for welfare in any event.
Sample 2 is also restricted due to the nature of wave 3. In addition to the lack of
geographical information, wave 3 was limited to include only respondents who had a
“focal child” available at the time the wave 2 interview was conducted. A focal child
is simply a child of the respondent about whom additional questions were asked at
each interview. Because of this, Sample 2 also excludes respondents in waves 1 and 2
who do not fit this same selection criteria. This resulted in only a minor sample
reduction (185 observations were lost).
Samples 1 and 2 both include information on the respondent’s demographic
characteristics such as age and race, her education level, and her income and her
spouse’s. In addition to these individual and couple characteristics, we are also
interested in some state-level variables such as the average monthly welfare benefit
per recipient and the unemployment rate. Some variables used in the analysis were
created using the information available in the sample. A description of the
construction of these variables follows.
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3.1 Constructed Variables
One of the two outcomes analyzed in the paper is domestic violence. The
question regarding violence in the relationship reads: “During the past year, how
many fights with your partner (husband/wife) resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or
throwing things at you?” A zero-one indicator variable was created that takes a value
of one if the number of such fights was greater than zero, and zero otherwise.2
The variable indicating welfare receipt was straightforward to construct in
waves 1 and 2, but less so in wave 3. In waves 1 and 2 respondents were asked if they
had received any income from public assistance. The only questions pertaining to
welfare receipt in wave 3, however, read: “(In the last 12 months did you (or anyone
in your entire household) receive. . .) public assistance, including AFDC, general
assistance, or payment from any other state welfare program? Include food stamps
and energy assistance; do not include Supplemental Security Income (SSI).” and
“Who received public assistance income? (ENTER PERSON NUMBER)”. This data
was combined with the person number information in order to construct a zero-one
indicator for any receipt of welfare payments by the respondent in the past 12 months.
Wave 3 also posed some difficulty in creating the respondent’s and spouse’s
income variables since the respondents were not asked about their spouse/partner’s
income directly. To create the relevant income variables the “respondent’s” income
was taken from both the main respondent data file and from the spouse data file and
the two separate datasets were merged. A composite variable was then created for the
respondent’s income that was equal to the main respondent’s income if the main
respondent was female and equal to the spouse’s income if the main respondent was
2

This question was asked of both married and cohabiting respondents. Two separate indicators were
created and then summed to create one composite variable that indicates the occurrence of violent
fights regardless of marital status.
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male. A similar variable was created for the spouse’s income. Couple income then is
simply the sum of the two. All income variables were adjusted to be in constant 1988
dollars.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics from samples 1 and 2. We can see that
overall domestic violence rates as well as welfare receipt rates are fairly low in both
samples. Though sample 2 is only a slightly modified version of sample 1, it is still
important to verify that the data from waves 1 and 2 in both samples are comparable.
Indeed, no substantial differences exist for any of the variables, and statistically
significant differences are only found for two of the race indicators and a few of the
state-level variables (not surprising considering that birth state is used in Sample 2
and state of residence is used in Sample 1). It should also be noted that over 50% of
the respondents in waves 1 and 2 are known to be currently living in their state of
birth. For welfare recipients and abuse victims this percentage is even higher at 70%
and 61% respectively, which strengthens the case for using birth state as a proxy.
However, a number of differences stand out in wave 3 of Sample 2. One such
difference occurs in the two variables of interest. Domestic violence rates are slightly
higher (though not significantly) and welfare receipt rates are significantly lower than
in waves 1 and 2. Since the reforms of the 1990’s, which aimed to reduce the number
of individuals dependent on welfare, had occurred between waves 2 and 3, this
difference is to be expected. Another difference that stands out is in the income of the
respondents and of their spouses/partners. It appears that in wave 3 the respondents
have significantly more income than in previous waves, but their spouses/partners
have significantly less income.
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Table 1.2 investigates how domestic violence rates differ with certain key
variables like welfare status, income levels, poverty status, race, and education level.
We can immediately see from that while there are slight differences in domestic
violence levels among different groups of women, most of these differences are not
significant. In fact, domestic violence only varies significantly by welfare status and
low income status. It appears that welfare recipients have nearly four times the
victimization rate as women who are not on welfare, which is consistent with the
literature. We also notice that women in low income households are also more likely
to be victims of domestic violence, though this difference is only minor compared to
the difference in welfare status. This seems to indicate that simply coming from a low
income household does not make women more likely to be victims, but rather the act
of receiving welfare benefits that makes the difference.

4. Model Selection
Using the model selection strategy described in section 2.3, we can now use
the NSFH data to determine which theoretical model best describes the relationship
between welfare receipt and domestic violence. This exercise is repeated for both
samples, though the included variables differ slightly between Sample 1 and Sample
2.
Ideally the model selection process would incorporate testing the model in
which welfare receipt and domestic violence are mutually determined. However, this
fully nested model is not identified using standard techniques. Thus, only the models
which are partially nested will be tested. Three different models will be estimated
according to the model selection procedure outlined in section 2. The baseline model
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will test whether the potential use of welfare or the underlying state of the relationship
have any effect on each other. The traditional model will test the relationship that has
been presented in the literature: that welfare receipt affects domestic violence rates.
Finally, the non-traditional model will test the reverse relationship: that domestic
violence affects whether a woman will receive welfare. Because each of these
relationships are theoretically valid, this model selection procedure will give us a
better idea of which relationships can be seen in the data as well as allow us to test
which model best fits the data.
A bivariate probit model is used initially in the model selection procedure to
test whether there is any correlation between the error terms of the two equations. If
we cannot reject that the correlation is zero then two separate probit models may be
run.
In order to identify both equations in the system, a set of excluded exogenous
variables is needed in each equation. In the domestic violence equation, state-level
variables indicating whether unilateral divorce is allowed as well as the ratio of single
men to single women are included. These variables should only affect the welfare
decision indirectly through how they affect the level of violence and the woman’s
outside option. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), for example, found that the presence of
unilateral divorce laws significantly decreased domestic violence rates, making it a
promising candidate for an excluded exogenous variable. The relative supply and
demand of single men to women should also affect domestic violence rates because it
measures one of the woman’s outside options. Women who have better options
outside of the relationship should be less willing to tolerate abuse. The higher this
ratio is then, the greater the likelihood the woman can find another partner if she
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should leave her current relationship. Thus, we expect the effect of this ratio on
domestic violence rates to be negative.
Also included in the domestic violence equation is a set of dummy variables
indicating the religion observed by the household. Here, atheism is treated as the
excluded group. A small literature has examined the relationship between religion and
domestic violence and it is typically found that regular attendance of religious
gatherings has an inverse relationship with domestic violence rates. Ellison and
Anderson (2002), for example, use the NSFH to analyze this relationship and find that
even after controlling for various individual and social factors that may affect
violence, regular attendance negatively affects violence rates.
The welfare equation includes state-level data on the average monthly welfare
benefit and the percentage of residents in the state that receive welfare payments each
month and also includes individual data on whether the respondent’s family received
welfare payments and if her mother worked while she was growing up. The
respondent’s economic conditions while growing up are likely to be the most reliable
excluded exogenous variables in this dataset. This is perhaps because individuals who
had exposure to the welfare system while growing up have greater access to
knowledge about the welfare system, how to apply, and what benefits they could
qualify for. There are numerous studies linking family conditions growing up to
welfare usage as an adult. Vartanian (1999), for example, finds that the more years an
individual’s family was receiving welfare as a child the more likely he/she is to go on
welfare as an adult, but that this result is only significant for African Americans.
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4.1 Baseline Model
The first model run assumes that

, or that actual welfare receipt

and actual domestic violence do not matter in the system. In this model the multiple
estimates of

and

are tested for equality and significance3. The results of the

baseline model can be found in Table 1.3.
It immediately stands out that we cannot reject that
may be that the individual estimates of
individual estimates of

and

and

(although it

are poor). In fact, none of the

were significantly different from zero. This

indicates that the temptation to use welfare services has no influence on whether a
relationship is abusive, and that the potential for abuse has no influence on whether a
woman chooses to go on welfare.
There is, however, an indirect relationship that emerges between the two
variables of interest and that is through the correlation of their error terms. There is a
positive and significant correlation of 0.33 to 0.37 in both samples. This indicates that
not only is the bivariate probit model more appropriate, but that unobservable factors
that affect domestic violence rates also have an impact on whether a woman receives
welfare and vice versa.
Also of note is the fact that both equations in Sample 1 have significant
excluded exogenous variables and for the most part these excluded exogenous
variables seem to be significant in only their respective equations.
4.2 Traditional Model
In the next model the assumption that either

is relaxed by

allowing welfare receipt to affect domestic violence. Note that this model is similar to
3

Because
and are both overidentified we will have multiple estimates for them, thus also
necessitating the test of equality.
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the model that has been commonly assumed in the literature and that the baseline
model is nested in this model, thus we can test between both specifications. The
results of this model specification can be found in Table 1.4.
Welfare appears to have no impact on domestic violence rates in Sample 1. In
fact, hardly any explanatory variables seem to have an impact on domestic violence.
Sample 2, however, finds that welfare does have some effect on domestic violence
rates in the years after the reforms took place, however, there is still no effect in the
years prior to the reforms.
As in the baseline model, both equations have significant excluded exogenous
variables, which indicates that this model is indeed identified. We can also reject the
baseline model relative to the traditional model through a likelihood ratio test.
4.3 Non-Traditional Model
The final model tested reverses the direction of the relationship between
domestic violence and welfare receipt and proposes that domestic violence affects a
woman’s decision of whether to receive welfare. As with the traditional model, the
baseline model is nested in this non-traditional model so we may test between the
two. The results of this model specification can be found in Table 1.5 (for Sample 1)
and Table 1.6 (for Sample 2).
We can see that domestic violence has a significant negative impact on
welfare take-up in the years prior to the reforms in both samples. We can also see in
Table 1.6 that this negative impact of domestic violence was magnified in the years
after the reforms.
The baseline model can also be rejected relative to the non-traditional model
through a likelihood ratio test. Finally, due to the higher log likelihoods in both
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samples and the significance of the variables of interest in all waves we can reject the
traditional model relative to the non-traditional model. This exercise thus implies that
the preferred model is:
(17)
(18)

where

and

are distributed joint normally.

Note that the direction of causality is opposite to what has been presumed in
the literature and that, of the three models estimated, the presumed model is not the
most preferred model which makes this finding all the more interesting.

5. Results
5.1 Pre-Reform Analysis
Table 1.5 presents the full set of estimates from the preferred model. Standard
errors are clustered on the respondents’ states of residence.
Estimates from the period before the welfare reforms took effect indicate that
domestic violence exerted a substantial negative influence on a woman’s decision to
receive welfare benefits even after taking income, schooling and other variables into
account. Going from a non-abusive relationship to an abusive one decreased the
likelihood that a woman went on welfare by a factor of 2.2, ceteris paribus, implying
the average woman in a non-abusive relationship would go from just over a 6 percent
chance of going on welfare to only a 3 percent chance if her current relationship were
to become abusive.
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This result suggests a somewhat troubling potential implication of the
PRWORA. If welfare is thought to be one means for women from low income
households to gain additional resources needed to flee an abusive relationship and the
reforms made it more difficult to receive aid, there could be negative impacts on
women who were victims of abuse. Since we have found that women who are in
abusive relationships are less likely to use welfare services, the new limits could cause
these women to stay in abusive relationships longer because welfare has become a
less viable option. While there have been efforts to address this issue through
initiatives such as the Family Violence Option, it is by no means certain that a woman
would identify herself as being abused or that her state has this type of program.
Many other factors are also important in determining whether a woman
receives welfare. All of the results in Table 1.5 have the expected signs, e.g., welfare
receipt is less likely for higher income households and for more educated individuals,
but more likely for larger households. One result that may not seem sensible is that
higher unemployment rates significantly decrease the likelihood that a woman will
receive welfare, although this might be explained if the household’s income at that
time is a poor reflection of its permanent income.
Interestingly enough, the only significant factors determining domestic
violence in this model are a person’s age, cohabitation status, and several of the
religion dummies. Older women are found to be less likely to be victims of abuse.
This is confirmed in previous studies which have hypothesized that older individuals
typically have had more time to accrue resources and are therefore less likely to
tolerate abuse. Older women also typically have had more time to search for a suitable
partner who is not abusive. We also see that women in cohabiting relationships are
more likely to be victims of abuse than married women. Stets and Straus (1990) found

25

similar results using data from the National Family Violence Survey. For the most
part it also appears that having some religious affiliation reduces the risk of violence
as well, a finding that is consistent with those of Ellison and Anderson (2002).
Also note that the value of rho is 0.860, a very strong positive correlation
between the error terms of the two equations. The test that rho is equal to zero is
rejected and therefore we can conclude that there is in fact some endogeneity that
needs to be accounted for in estimation. Thus the bivariate probit model is more
appropriate than individual probit models.
Finally, because of the correlation between the error terms of both equations
and because domestic violence appears in the welfare equation, it is necessary to
satisfy the condition that the excluded exogenous variables in the domestic violence
equation be jointly significant. A X2 test of the hypothesis that the coefficients are
jointly equal to zero is run on the variables: unilateral divorce, single sex ratio, and
religion. The results of the test indicate that at 99 percent confidence we can reject the
hypothesis and that the model is indeed identified.
5.2 Post-Reform Analysis
A similar bivariate probit model is run for Sample 2, which includes the wave
of data that occurred after the welfare reforms took place, to see if our predictions of
the effects of the reforms are supported. Additional indicators include whether the
data come from wave 3, whether a woman’s state of birth has adopted the FVO, and
each possible interaction between domestic violence, wave 3 and FVO status. The
results of this estimation can be found in Table 1.6.
Domestic violence is still found to exert a significantly large negative
influence on a woman’s choice to go on welfare, and the effect appears to be
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magnified in the post-reform years. This is consistent with what was predicted: the
reforms made it less likely that anyone would receive welfare, including abused
women. Also of note is the result that women who reported abuse were more likely to
go on welfare if their state of birth had adopted the FVO than women who were not
victims in that state, suggesting that the FVO at least partially achieved the goal of
making welfare more accessible to victims of abuse.
To gain a better understanding of the magnitudes of these changes we can
compare the predicted probability of receiving welfare under different combinations
of pre and post reform eras, victim status, and FVO status. Table 1.7 presents the
predicted probability that a woman will receive welfare given these different
combinations of characteristics.
There are several notable estimates. First, women who were victims of abuse
were seven times more likely to go on welfare, pre-reform, in states that would
ultimately end up adopting the FVO than victims in non-FVO states. We also observe
that while there was a dramatic reduction in the probability of receiving welfare for
women in FVO states after the reforms took place, the likelihood of going on welfare
for women in non-FVO states after the reforms was reduced to essentially zero. Both
of these observations suggest that the FVO initiative did at least help alleviate some of
the negative impacts of the reforms on victims.
We can also see that victims of abuse in the post-reform era were more likely
to receive welfare if their birth state had adopted the FVO. While this effect only
brings the likelihood of welfare receipt up to 0.1 percent it is a large effect compared
with the likelihood in non-FVO states.
Unfortunately it appears that the overall effect of domestic violence on welfare
receipt is negative. Despite the efforts of the FVO to increase access to aid to
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victimized women these women are still less likely to use the welfare system than
women in safer relationships which suggests that other initiatives may be required to
help increase access. Not all states have provisions allowing exemptions from TANF
requirements for victims of abuse, so making these provisions a requirement for all
states may help improve conditions for victims. Additional programs aimed at helping
victimized women become self-sufficient such as education, job-training programs, or
welfare-to-work programs specifically targeted at women may also improve
conditions for abused women.
Both equations also have excluded exogenous variables that are significant.
The state-level variable measuring the percentage of the state’s population that
receives welfare assistance per month is found to significantly positively increase the
likelihood of welfare receipt which is consistent with what is expected. Religion again
plays a significant role in determining the likelihood of domestic violence with any
kind of religious affiliation diminishing the likelihood of violence. A state having
unilateral divorce also significantly reduces the likelihood of domestic violence which
is consistent with the earlier findings of Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). The
hypothesis that the excluded exogenous variables are jointly insignificant is rejected
for the domestic violence equation at 99 percent, again indicating that the model is
identified.

6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
The results found in this study are worrying given the nature of the 1996
reforms since they made it more difficult to receive benefits and limited the amount of
time one could collect them. If women are unable to use the welfare system as a
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means to escape violent relationships because the system’s requirements are too strict
given their conditions, and if the welfare system is now cutting back on the number of
people who can receive benefits there may be an adverse impact on the rates of
domestic abuse. Policy makers have attempted to address this issue by constructing an
optional Family Violence Option that states can adopt individually which would help
women who identified themselves as being victims by waiving some of the limitations
of the new policy, but in light of the results of this study it seems that the reforms still
had a substantial negative impact on women who were in violent relationships.
This study did establish that states that ultimately would adopt the FVO had
higher rates of victimized women in the system than states that did not adopt the FVO
even in the pre-reform era. One extension of this work might be to carefully analyze
the pre-reform characteristics of the welfare system in the states that eventually
adopted the FVO to see if there are any major differences between them and non-FVO
states that make them more accessible to victimized women. Further, states had
considerable freedom in how they chose to implement the FVO and could choose
which welfare requirements they wanted to waive for victims as well as if they
wanted to offer additional services to victims such as referral to battered women’s
shelters. Analysis of these differences and how they affect welfare receipt for victims
may offer even greater insight as to what can be done to improve the system.
Another extension to this research might focus on how the labor force
participation of women and domestic violence are related. This study could
encompass a wider variety of women since the decision of whether or not to work
must be made at all income levels, but the choice to go on welfare or not is only
relevant for those with low enough incomes. Such a study could also provide some
insight into how the use of domestic violence differs by income levels. It could
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answer questions such as whether men with lower incomes were more or less likely to
be threatened by a woman working and contributing a significant amount to a
household’s pool of resources.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics Samples 1 and 2
Variable
Domestic Violence
Welfare
Age
Number of Children
Schooling
White
Black
Hispanic
Respondent’s Income
Spouse/Partner’s Income
Welfare Growing Up
Mother Worked
Cohabiting
Unilateral Divorce
Unemployment Rate
Single Sex Ratio
% Monthly Welfare Recipients
Avg. Monthly Welfare Payment
SMSA status
Northeast
Northcentral
South
West
Spouse Present at Interview

Average Value
(Sample 1)
0.056
(0.005)
0.066
(0.005)
39.011
(0.267)
2.530
(0.043)
11.969
(0.053)
0.747
(0.009)
0.163
(0.008)
0.089
(0.006)
5395.696
(157.045)
14049.090
(260.707)
0.143
(0.007)
0.535
(0.011)
0.047
(0.005)
0.568
(0.011)
3.301
(0.056)
1.094
(0.001)
4.492
(0.034)
1368.726
(11.236)
0.702
(0.010)
0.146
(0.008)
0.299
(0.010)
0.385
(0.035)
0.171
(0.008)
0.352
(0.010)
2194

Average Value
(Sample 2: Waves 1 and 2)
0.057
(0.005)
0.066
(0.006)
38.878
(0.281)
2.509
(0.045)
12.091
(0.052)
0.770
(0.009)
0.167
(0.008)
0.063
(0.005)
5360.756
(163.118)
14205.580
(273.192)
0.146
(0.008)
0.544
(0.011)
0.048
(0.005)
0.537
(0.011)
5.846
(0.033)
1.093
(0.001)
4.633
(0.034)
1364.482
(11.703)
N/A

Average Value
(Sample 2: Wave 3)
0.070
(0.009)
0.007
(0.003)
53.869
(0.231)
2.057
(0.011)
10.384
(0.219)
0.744
(0.016)
0.178
(0.014)
0.078
(0.010)
8681.322
(489.187)
8495.406
(491.378)
0.127
(0.012)
0.499
(0.018)
0.053
(0.008)
0.533
(0.018)
5.541
(0.029)
1.077
(0.002)
1.806
(0.032)
1473.531
(22.908)
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Number of Observations
2018
758
Notes:
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
Monetary values in constant 1988 dollars.
Sample restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line.
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels respectively.
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Table 1.2: Domestic Violence Rates Across Groups (Sample 1)

Variable
White

N
1640

Non-White

554

Black

358

Non-Black

1836

Hispanic

196

Non-Hispanic

1998

On Welfare

144

Not on Welfare

2050

In Poverty

669

Not in Poverty

1525

No HS Diploma

482

HS or Higher

1712

Mean
0.057
(0.006)
0.054
(0.010)
0.059
(0.012)
0.056
(0.005)
0.046
(0.015)
0.057
(0.005)
0.181
(0.032)
0.047
(0.005)
0.060
(0.009)
0.054
(0.006)
0.058
(0.011)
0.055
(0.006)

Difference
0.003
(0.011)

0.003
(0.014)

-0.011
(0.016)

0.133***
(0.033)

0.005
(0.011)

-0.003
(0.012)

Notes:
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
Sample restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty
line.
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence
levels.
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Table 1.3: Model Selection Results (Baseline Model)
Variable
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0)

Sample 1: Pre-Reform
Coefficient
Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
(D.V. Eq.)
(0.992)

W* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0)

(0.529)

Wave 3
Wave 3 x FVO
FVO
Household Size
Number of Children
Age
Schooling
Log of Resp. Income
Log of Couple Income
Black
Hispanic
SMSA
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Welfare:
Welfare Growing Up
Mother Worked
% Mo. Welfare Recipients
Average Mo. Benefit
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion Dummies

Sample 2: All Waves
Coefficient
Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
(D.V. Eq.)
(0.891)
(0.886)
-0.164
(0.315)
-0.885**
(0.414)
0.082
(0.120)
0.085***
(0.026)
3.71x10-4
(0.024)
-0.041***
(0.006)
-0.069***
(0.021)
-0.032***
(0.011)
-0.094***
(0.014)
0.345***
(0.132)
-0.196
(0.168)

0.599**
(0.275)
0.061
(0.257)
0.191
(0.123)
0.001
(0.025)
-0.009
(0.027)
-0.030***
(0.005)
-0.023***
(0.009)
0.011
(0.011)
-0.029**
(0.013)
0.032
(0.099)
0.021
(0.178)

-0.040
(0.177)
-0.185
(0.119)
-0.384**
(0.193)
-0.093**
(0.040)

-0.022
(0.135)
-0.225*
(0.122)
-0.276
(0.172)
-0.012
(0.036)

0.082***
(0.035)
-0.011
(0.024)
-0.041***
(0.005)
-0.075***
(0.020)
-0.046***
(0.011)
-0.085***
(0.014)
0.343**
(0.101)
-0.308
(0.196)
0.092
(0.105)
-0.312*
(0.183)
-0.084
(0.107)
-0.225*
(0.133)
-0.040**
(0.017)

0.010
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.723)
-0.036***
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.020)
0.021*
(0.013)
-0.025
(0.018)
0.023
(0.117)
-0.122
(0.166)
-0.063
(0.105)
0.081
(0.170)
-0.093
(0.101)
0.170
(0.136)
-0.019
(0.019)

0.231*
(0.123)
-0.102
(0.089)
-0.024
(0.034)
2.31x10-5
(8.92x10-5)

0.218**
(0.110)
-0.074
(0.089)
0.011
(0.040)
1.57x10-5
(1.15x10-4)

0.163
(0.114)
-0.036
(0.094)
0.065
(0.043)
-2.72x10-4
(1.91x10-4)

-0.033
(0.104)
0.076
(0.083)
0.033
(0.037)
-7.67x10-5
(9.49x10-5)

-0.048
(0.081)
0.611
(0.485)
*

0.010
(0.101)
-0.034
(0.803)
***

0.016
(0.094)
1.073
(0.658)
***

-0.137
(0.092)
0.351
(0.783)
***

Number of Observations
N = 2194
N = 2776
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -823.514
L = -976.727
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.365
p-value = 0.000
Rho = 0.332
p-value = 0.000
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses.
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of
all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Table 1.4: Model Selection Results (Traditional Model)
Variable
Welfare

Sample 1: Pre-Reform
Coefficient
Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
(D.V. Eq.)
0.873
(1.620)

Welfare x Wave 3
Welfare x FVO
Welfare x Wave 3 x FVO
Wave 3
Wave 3 x FVO
FVO
Household Size
Number of Children
Age
Schooling
Log of Resp. Income
Log of Couple Income
Black
Hispanic
SMSA
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Welfare:
Welfare Growing Up
Mother Worked
% Mo. Welfare Recipients
Average Mo. Benefit
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion Dummies

0.073**
(0.036)
-0.010
(0.025)
-0.041***
(0.004)
-0.082***
(0.020)
-0.040***
(0.011)
-0.082***
(0.014)
0.326**
(0.098)
-0.336*
(0.201)
0.063
(0.102)
-0.278
(0.199)
-0.113
(0.108)
-0.245*
(0.149)
-0.042**
(0.019)

-0.006
(0.032)
-0.004
(0.029)
-0.032***
(0.010)
0.003
(0.030)
0.027*
(0.015)
-0.009
(0.036)
-0.019
(0.139)
-0.065
(0.174)
-0.077
(0.106)
0.128
(0.172)
-0.086
(0.107)
0.203
(0.143)
-0.015
(0.020)

0.244*
(0.127)
-0.085
(0.087)
-0.038
(0.030)
2.38x10-5
(9.66x10-5)

Sample 2: All Waves
Coefficient
Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
(D.V. Eq.)
0.270
(0.982)
-4.592***
(0.756)
0.847*
(0.498)
4.797***
(0.882)
-0.166
0.468*
(0.318)
(0.253)
-0.792**
0.152
(0.385)
(0.267)
0.042
0.085
(0.116)
(0.132)
0.073***
-0.013
(0.025)
(0.027)
0.006
-0.016
(0.021)
(0.028)
-0.040***
-0.025***
(0.006)
(0.005)
-0.074***
-0.019**
(0.021)
(0.009)
-0.027**
0.015
(0.012)
(0.011)
-0.085***
-0.019
(0.014)
(0.014)
0.322***
-0.008
(0.124)
(0.108)
-0.175
0.061
(0.174)
(0.181)

0.002
(0.167)
-0.153
(0.115)
-0.250
(0.193)
-0.113***
(0.042)

-0.037
(0.129)
-0.207*
(0.108)
-0.254
(0.166)
0.008
(0.032)

0.163
(0.107)
-0.049
(0.097)
0.077*
(0.041)
-2.803x10-4
(1.762x10-4)
0.016
(0.103)
-0.267
(0.746)
***

-0.140
(0.088)
0.184
(0.738)
***

Number of Observations
N = 2194
N = 2776
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -841.926
L = -991.934
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = -0.086
p-value = 0.916
Rho = -0.192
p-value = 0.630
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses.
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test
of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.

36

Table 1.5: Results of Preferred Model Sample 1 (waves 1 and 2—pre-reform)
Variable
Domestic Violence
Household Size
Number of Children
Age
Schooling
Log of Resp. Income
Log of Couple Income
Black
Hispanic
SMSA
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Welfare Growing Up
Mother Worked
% Mo. Welfare Recipients
Average Mo. Benefit
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion Dummies

Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
-1.127***
(0.088)
0.057**
(0.025)
-0.001
(0.022)
-0.040***
(0.004)
-0.056***
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.010)
-0.069***
(0.014)
0.189**
(0.076)
-0.231
(0.161)
0.002
(0.085)
-0.173
(0.146)
-0.100
(0.089)
-0.058
(0.120)
-0.050***
(0.013)
0.096
(0.070)
-0.037
(0.048)
-0.014
(0.025)
2.29x10-5
(4.75x10-5)

Marginal Effect
(Welfare Eq.)
-2.191***
(0.175)
0.111**
(0.050)
-0.003
(0.042)
-0.078***
(0.008)
-0.110***
(0.031)
-0.026
(0.019)
-0.134***
(0.028)
0.368**
(0.148)
-0.450
(0.313)
0.004
(0.165)
-0.336
(0.285)
-0.195
(0.173)
-0.112
(0.233)
-0.096***
(0.025)

Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)

Marginal Effect
(D.V. Eq.)

0.005
(0.031)
0.015
(0.032)
-0.033***
(0.005)
-0.021
(0.022)
0.015
(0.013)
-0.006
(0.017)
0.037
(0.112)
-0.231
(0.163)
-0.039
(0.125)
-0.010
(0.150)
-0.075
(0.095)
0.203
(0.127)
-0.022
(0.015)

0.011
(0.072)
0.034
(0.074)
-0.077***
(0.011)
-0.049
(0.051)
0.035
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.039)
0.086
(0.259)
-0.533
(0.379)
-0.091
(0.288)
-0.024
(0.346)
-0.173
(0.220)
0.467
(0.295)
-0.050
(0.035)

0.003
(0.083)
0.424
(0.537)
***

0.007
(0.191)
0.978
(1.236)
***

0.187
(0.138)
-0.072
(0.093)
-0.027
(0.048)
4.45x10-5
(9.22x10-5)

Number of Observations
N = 2194
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -846.864
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.860
p-value = 0.008
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses.
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of
all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Table 1.6: Results of Preferred Model Sample 2 (Waves 1, 2, and 3)
Variable
Domestic Violence
D.V. x Wave 3
D.V. x FVO
D.V. x Wave 3 x FVO
Wave 3
Wave 3 x FVO
FVO
Household Size
Number of Children
Age
Schooling
Log of Resp. Income
Log of Couple Income
Black
Hispanic
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Welfare Growing Up
Mother Worked
% Mo. Welfare Recipients
Average Mo. Benefit
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion Dummies

Coefficient
(Welfare Eq.)
-1.345**
(0.623)
-4.746***
(0.597)
1.122**
(0.437)
3.924***
(0.663)
-0.117
(0.283)
-0.699*
(0.395)
-0.054
(0.116)
0.077***
(0.024)
0.013
(0.021)
-0.036***
(0.005)
-0.071***
(0.020)
-0.028**
(0.012)
-0.080***
(0.013)
0.273**
(0.128)
-0.146
(0.176)
-0.033
(0.165)
-0.164
(0.116)
-0.329*
(0.194)
-0.093**
(0.041)
0.144
(0.100)
-0.052
(0.093)
0.077*
(0.039)
-2.441x10-4
(1.637x10-4)

Marginal Effect
(Welfare Eq.)
-3.215**
(1.393)

-2.168**
(0.947)

-0.093
(0.375)
0.190***
(0.062)
0.033
(0.051)
-0.089***
(0.016)
-0.175***
(0.054)
-0.069**
(0.031)
-0.197***
(0.038)
0.675**
(0.326)
-0.360
(0.440)
-0.081
(0.409)
-0.404
(0.288)
-0.812*
(0.476)
-0.229**
(0.107)

Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)

Marginal Effect
(D.V. Eq.)

0.270
(0.144)
0.112
(0.279)
0.144
(0.152)
-0.001
(0.028)
0.016
(0.028)
-0.022***
(0.005)
-0.014
(0.009)
0.009
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.013)
-0.071
(0.112)
0.082
(0.179)
-0.031
(0.140)
-0.226*
(0.121)
-0.261
(0.175)
0.013
(0.034)

0.871***
(0.260)

-0.163*
(0.097)
-0.507
(0.882)
***

-0.404*
(0.242)
-1.255
(2.172)
***

0.438
(0.329)
-0.003
(0.069)
0.039
(0.070)
-0.054***
(0.013)
-0.034
(0.021)
0.022
(0.028)
-0.041
(0.032)
-0.175
(0.277)
0.204
(0.444)
-0.076
(0.346)
-0.558*
(0.302)
-0.645
(0.435)
0.031
(0.084)

0.356
(0.247)
-0.129
(0.230)
0.190*
(0.102)
-0.001
(0.0004)

Number of Observations
N=2776
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -996.106
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.509
p-value = 0.001
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on percentage monthly welfare recipients in parentheses.
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct and indirect effects when applicable.
Samples restricted to households with a total income below three times the poverty line.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test
of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Table 1.7: Variations in Likelihood of Welfare Receipt

Wave 3 x Domestic Violence x FVO Pr(W=1 | 3, D, F) Standard Error
0, 0, 0
0.070
0.015
0, 0, 1
0.064
0.012
0, 1, 0
0.005
0.006
0, 1, 1
0.044
0.035
1, 0, 0
0.058
0.025
1, 0, 1
0.015
0.011
1, 1, 0
5.09x10-11
9.55x10-11
1, 1, 1
0.001
0.002
Notes:
Predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all personal and state-level
characteristics constant, but treating every observation as being in wave 3, a
victim, and/or in an FVO state.
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Chapter 2: “Women’s Employment and Domestic Violence: An Analysis by
Income Levels”

Introduction
Women stay in abusive relationships or return to them for various reasons.
Among these reasons is a lack of financial independence. It is logical then to suppose
that gaining employment or furthering her education could potentially give a woman
enough resources to leave the relationship if she chooses or at least increase her
bargaining power enough to deter abuse. This, however, is not always the case.
Considerable evidence has shown that a woman’s employment may actually
provoke abuse. A study conducted by Allard et al in 1996 showed that victims of
abuse are fifteen times more likely to have partners that disapproved of their attempts
to work or further their education and actively tried to prevent it. Intervention could
be non-violent in the form of turning off alarms before work, destroying class notes
etc., but could also take a more violent form via abuse before important job interviews
and other similar methods. This evidence suggests that programs aimed at increasing
educational attainment and improving employment opportunities for women may
actually have an unintended negative effect on women who are victims of abuse.
Thus far the literature has been divided as to the direction of the relationship.
Does employment provoke a reaction in terms of domestic violence, or does domestic
violence influence a woman’s decision to work. There has, however, been a
consensus that the relationship does depend on several factors, primarily the relative
bargaining powers of the man and woman. While many different methods of
measuring this bargaining power have been used, the primary idea is that if a woman
has a relatively high amount of bargaining power to begin with, employment may
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raise her threat point enough that we see a negative relationship between abuse and
employment emerge. Conversely, for women with relatively low bargaining power,
employment may not raise her threat point enough and a positive relationship between
abuse and employment may emerge.
This paper uses a similar theoretical framework to that in the literature and
suggests that the relationship is likely different for women with spouses of different
income levels. Further, several theoretical relationships between domestic violence
and employment are tested to see if the relationship is more complex than the
literature has assumed. Ultimately it is found that working has a positive effect on
domestic violence for women that are in relationships with lower income men, but
that working has a negative effect on domestic violence for women with higher
income spouses/partners. There doesn’t appear to be any effect of domestic violence
on employment for either of these two groups.
If the models of assortative matching in the marriage market are to be
believed, these findings suggest that women who have lower income spouses/partners
are more likely to also command a lower wage in the labor market. Because of this,
they are also less likely to be entirely self-sufficient even if they choose to work.
Thus, if their spouse/partner does not approve of their working, employment could
increase the level and amount of conflicts and unfortunately not provide her with
sufficient resources to leave the relationship. Conversely, women who have higher
income spouses/partners are more likely to also command a higher wage in the labor
market implying a higher likelihood of becoming self-sufficient. In this case, violence
may actually push the woman out of the relationship, and thus will not be used to
deter behavior if one of the goals of the spouse is to keep the relationship intact.

41

These findings are troubling given that women with lower outside options are
the ones that could potentially benefit the most from education, employment, and
other programs aimed at victims of abuse. Unfortunately, unless such programs
significantly improve the bargaining power of abuse victims they may actually have
the unintended effect of making matters worse.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 1 discusses the
relevant literature, section 2 presents the various theoretical relationships between
employment and domestic violence as well as proposes a method for choosing
between the various empirical models, section 3 describes the data used in the
analysis, section 4 discusses the model selection process and presents the preferred
model of analysis, section 5 presents the results of estimation, and section 6
concludes.

1. Literature
To date, the literature has analyzed the relationship between employment
status of women and domestic violence from a number of different angles. Some
propose that the direction of impact is that working has an impact on whether a
woman will experience abuse, while others suggest that domestic violence actually
affects whether a woman chooses to work. Regardless of the direction of impact
assumed, most studies have suggested that the relationship between the two variables
of interest depends at least in part on the characteristics of both the woman and the
man. Finally, because the relationship between domestic violence and women’s
employment is a much bigger issue in developing countries, a lot of focus has been
placed on analysis within those regions.
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Those studies that maintain that employment has an effect on abuse typically
find that the relationship depends upon the relative bargaining powers of both the
male and female. For example, Heath (2012) finds in her study in Dhaka that women
who have lower levels of education and marry at a young age tend to be more likely
to generate abusive reactions from their spouses when they enter the workforce, but
that there is no impact on abuse for women with better education who married later.
Similarly, Macmillan and Gartner (1999) in a study of Canadian women find that
women who choose to work when their husband is unemployed have an increase in
the likelihood of abuse whereas women who choose to work when their husband is
also employed actually see a decrease in the likelihood of abuse.
Aizer (2010) instead looks at the relationship between the relative wages of
men and women instead of the actual employment status of the woman. She finds that
increases in the relative wages of women generally decrease the likelihood of
domestic violence. Higher wages mean more bargaining power and higher threat
points, which means that the higher the wage the less likely violence will be able to be
used as a deterrent to employment.
These findings are consistent with theoretical models such as Eswaran and
Malhotra (2011), who predict that the effect of employment on domestic violence
depends on how employment affects the relative bargaining power and threat point of
the woman. Working should increase the decision-making power of the woman in the
household. This could potentially lead to conflicts if the husband and wife do not
agree on how household resources should be managed. For women who don’t see a
large increase in their bargaining power, they may see an increase in the level of
domestic violence which is being used by the male to regain his dominant role in the
household. On the other hand, for women who do receive a substantial increase in
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their relative bargaining power, working may actually deter abuse since the male
wants to keep the relationship intact and his spouse/partner may leave him if he
becomes abusive.
Another strain of the literature proposes that domestic violence impacts a
woman’s decision to enter the workforce. One such study by Bowlus and Seitz (1998)
finds that the effect of domestic violence on employment decisions depends on the
marital status of the woman. For married or divorced women, abuse in current or past
relationships negatively affects her decision to become employed. However, for
women who are re-married current or past abuse increases the likelihood of entering
the workforce.
Currently there do not appear to be any studies that look at the relationship
between employment status and domestic violence and how the relationship differs by
the income level of the spouse. This study proposes a rationale similar to Heath
(2012) and Eswaran and Malhotra (2011) to explain why the relationship may differ
by income levels. Women in relationships with men of lower incomes likely have
lower ability levels and therefore fewer outside options, but women in relationships
with higher income men likely have better outside options. This means that women in
higher income households are more likely to be able to raise their threat point enough
to deter domestic violence in response to employment, but that women in lower
income households may not be able to raise their threat point enough.
Finally, no study to date has taken into account the potential dual relationship
between domestic violence and employment status, though current studies have
shown evidence for both directions of impact. This study will be the first to test
multiple potential relationships between abuse and employment to determine the most
appropriate model.
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2. Theory
We have seen that a variety of relationships between women’s employment
and domestic violence may exist, however, most studies assume one direction of
impact or the other and do not allow for other relationships to exist. Given the
empirical evidence to date, there seems to be a valid concern that the actual
relationship may be more complicated than previously thought.
In addition to the uncertain direction of impact, it is also unclear whether the
relationship between domestic violence and employment status is driven by the actual
presence of violence and actual employment, or rather by underlying conditions that
are correlated with one or both. To explore the possibilities more fully, I adapt Milli’s
(2013) method to the problem at hand. Consider the following system of equations:
(1)
(2)

where D* is a latent variable that indicates the underlying state of a relationship, and
D is an indicator that takes a value of 1 (indicating a violent relationship) if

.

W* is a latent variable that represents the temptation to enter the workforce, and W is
an indicator which takes a value of 1 (indicating the respondent being employed) if
. X is a vector of variables that influence both violence and working status, Y
a vector of variables that influence only violence, and Z a vector of variables that
influence only employment. The error terms

and

may also be correlated, possibly

because unobserved factors affect both outcomes. This possible correlation will
motivate the bivariate probit model used in the empirical estimation.
This system allows for several potential relationships between violence and
employment status. We are particularly interested in the coefficients

,

,

, and
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. Each may or may not be equal to zero, depending on which factors are important
in determining the relationship.
In the analysis that is carried out in this paper I test three different
relationships that are nested in this system. Two of which have been used in the
literature, the other is one that proposes an indirect relationship between the two
variables of interest. A discussion of the three models that will be estimated follows.
2.1 Baseline Model: Indirect Effects
In this baseline model I assume that domestic violence has no direct impact on
employment and employment has no direct impact on domestic violence. Rather, the
underlying states that determine both violence and employment affect one another.
This gives us the following system of equations:
(3)
(4)

Again, W* and D* are unobservable in this model and as such

and

cannot be

estimated directly.
To estimate

and

I estimate the reduced form of the system above by

plugging D* into the W* equation and vice versa. The coefficients of interest then can
be found by calculating different ratios of the excluded exogenous variables. There
will be multiple estimates of each of these coefficients, so they must also be tested for
equality.
It is unclear what relationship will emerge in this scenario as several are
theoretically plausible. For instance, a higher temptation to enter the workforce may
provoke a reaction in terms of abuse. Further this reaction may differ by income
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levels, as women in higher income households likely have higher outside options and
may effectively use employment as a deterrent to abuse.
The underlying state of the relationship may also influence a woman’s
decision of whether to work. Abuse is not the only factor that women consider when
choosing to leave or stay. If the relationship is significantly bad, a woman may
consider leaving the relationship and thus choose to find employment to increase the
amount of resources she has if she does decide to leave. However, if employment
would not earn her sufficient resources she may choose not to work and become more
compliant with her spouse/partner in order to prevent abuse in the future.
2.2 Domestic Violence Effect Model
One of the models that has dominated the literature proposes that a woman’s
choice to enter the workforce depends on the actual presence of violence in the
relationship, but that employment does not influence whether a relationship is
abusive. I add to this model by also allowing for domestic violence to have an indirect
effect on a woman’s choice of employment. This model simplifies the original system
of equations to the following:
(5)
(6)

As with the baseline model D* is unobservable meaning that
estimated through ratios of reduced form estimates. Note that if

must again be
is found to be

significant in the baseline model, the model can be further simplified and the reduced
form estimation will not be necessary.
A woman may choose to start working in response to a relationship becoming
abusive. This could be for a number of reasons. She could be attempting to gain the
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monetary and social resources that she needs to leave the relationship. She could also
choose to work as an attempt to get away from the abuse by spending more time away
from home. This suggests that perhaps

>0.

This positive relationship is more likely to be observed in higher income
households where women typically have better outside options. Working could bring
her the resources that she needs to leave, and thus provide the woman with greater
bargaining power in the future to deter violent behavior.
On the other hand if working does not provide a significant enough
improvement in the woman’s bargaining power, i.e. her income from working is not
high enough, she may not be able to leave the relationship and abuse may be an
effective deterrent to future employment. Situations such as these are very common
particularly among low income households (see Allard et al [1996] for examples).
2.3 Employment Effect Model
Another model that has dominated the literature suggests that women’s
employment has an impact on the level of abuse that she experiences but that abuse
has no impact on her choice of employment. This analysis also allows for the
possibility that the temptation to enter the workforce also influences whether a
relationship is abusive. The appropriate system of equations for this model
specification is:
(7)
(8)

A similar method of estimation to the domestic violence effect model will be applied
to this model. Again, if

is found to be insignificant in the baseline model the

estimated model can be further simplified.
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The direction of this effect is likely a function of several factors including the
spouse’s income and the woman’s predicted wage should she enter the workforce. On
one hand the male may be attempting to control her and feels threatened by her
working. It could be that he wants to keep her isolated from friends and family, and
entering the workforce would give her access to a wider social network. It could also
be that he has strong views on gender roles and feels that her entering the workforce is
a signal that he is failing to adequately provide for his family. Both scenarios suggest
a positive relationship between women’s employment and domestic violence. In other
words

>0.
There are some reasons to believe that this relationship may be more likely in

households with low incomes. Women who are in a relationship with low income men
are more likely to also have low incomes should they choose to work. If this is the
case then domestic violence could be an effective deterrent to working since the low
income would likely not be enough for the woman to become self-sufficient and
ultimately be able to leave if necessary.
Conversely, having two earners in a household eases financial stress which
could potentially reduce the number of arguments that could turn violent. The woman
may also be able to leave the relationship if her income is high enough. If one of the
goals of the spouse is to keep the relationship intact, then he may actually reduce the
level of violence or refrain from using it altogether. This suggests that perhaps

>0.

Similarly, there are reasons to believe that this relationship may be more likely
in households with high incomes. Women that are in relationships with higher income
men are more likely to also have higher incomes should they choose to work. Because
higher incomes mean higher threat points and more bargaining power for women,
they can use their bargaining power to drive down the level of violence.
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2.4 Model Selection Procedure
While some of the proposed theoretical relationships may seem more valid
than others, none can be completely ruled out. Because of this, a theoretically agnostic
approach to finding the correct specification will be used.
Each of the three models will initially be estimated with a bivariate probit
model to test the assumption that

and

are correlated with one another. If we

cannot reject that the correlation between the two error terms is equal to zero, then
two separate probit models will be used instead.
Ideally this model selection procedure would also estimate the full model in
which both employment and domestic violence were allowed to simultaneously
determine one another. However, the system of equations cannot be properly
estimated with the bivariate probit model when both domestic violence and
employment are mutually determined (see Heckman [1978]). Thus only models that
are partially nested in the full model will be tested.
This estimation strategy will allow us to test all of the previously proposed
models in the literature as well as add a layer of complexity by allowing the
underlying states determining violence and employment to have an impact. When
applied to the data, we should be able to determine which model best fits the data and
thus best describes the relationship between employment and domestic violence. A
nice feature of this estimation strategy is that it also allows employment and domestic
violence to be related even if

,

,

, and

are all found to be zero through the

correlation between the error terms.
The model that is selected as the preferred model will be chosen based on
whether it shows a significant relationship between the variables of interest, if any
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other model specifications find significant relationships, and what the log likelihood
of the model is compared with other model specifications.

3. Data
The data used in this analysis come from the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH), a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 13,017 adult
respondents interviewed in three separate waves: 1987-88, 1992-94, and 2001-2003.
While other data sets such as the National Crime Victimization Survey also have
information on both domestic violence and employment status, the NSFH provides a
richer set of variables that give information on not only the respondent but the
spouse/partner, family environment, and the respondent’s experience growing up. In
addition, the survey questions regarding domestic violence were worded in such a
way as to encourage self-reporting. The survey question reads as “During the past
year, how many fights with your partner resulted in him/her hitting, shoving, or
throwing things at you?”. Because this survey question does not rely on incidents
being reported to the police, the potential number of incidence reported is much
higher than most other surveys.
Unfortunately, due to funding issues, geographic information for each
respondent is unavailable in wave 3, so state-level variables for the respondent’s state
of residence cannot be included. To address this issue I use state of birth as a proxy
for state of residence in all three waves. Birth state is used for two reasons: 1) because
over half of the sample still lives in their state of birth, and 2) while I do know
whether the respondent’s state is the same in wave 3 as it was in wave 2 there may be
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non-random reasons why it is not the same, whereas the reasons why current state and
birth state are different are much more likely to be random.
Because we are interested in the relationship between domestic violence and
employment status and how it differs by income levels, two samples will be drawn
from the data set. The first sample, the low income household sample, contains all
respondents whose spouse/partner had an income at or below the median value.
Likewise, the second sample, the high income household sample, contains all
respondents whose spouse/partner had an income above the median value. Spousal
income was used in lieu of household income because the cut-off point between low
and high income households would become a function of the woman’s income as well
and therefore be dependent on whether she was working.
Both samples are restricted to include only women who are either married or
cohabiting with an intimate partner at the time of the interview as domestic violence
data are not available for other women. In addition to the lack of geographical
information, wave 3 was limited to include only respondents who had a “focal child”
available at the time the wave 2 interview was conducted. A focal child is simply a
child of the respondent about whom additional questions were asked at each
interview. Because of this, I also exclude respondents in waves 1 and 2 who do not fit
this same selection criteria. This resulted in only a minor sample reduction (185
observations were lost).
Information on the respondent’s demographic characteristics such as age and
race, her education level, and her and her spouse’s income are included in the data set.
In addition to these individual and couple characteristics, we are also interested in
some state-level variables such as the average log wages for men and women, birth
rates, and the unemployment rate.
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3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for both the low and high income
samples. The victimization rate appears to vary slightly by income level with lower
income households being slightly more susceptible to violence at 6.3 percent versus
only 4.1 percent for higher income households. This pattern is consistent with
findings in other surveys including the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Intimate Partner
Violence in the U.S. study that finds that the prevalence of domestic violence is the
highest for very low income groups and gradually declines as household incomes rise.
It is also consistent with the theory that women who have spouses/partners who have
higher incomes tend to have better outside options, so that these women are more
likely to leave violent partners.
This theory is further supported by the observation that women that have
spouses/partners with high incomes have higher education levels than women in low
income households, implying that they would likely also have high incomes should
they choose to work. One additional implication of this finding is that women in
higher income households are also more likely to be able to attract a wider range of
potential partners, thus husbands/partners are less likely to be abusive for fear that the
woman will leave.
One final thing we notice is that women in lower income households are less
likely to be married and more likely to be cohabiting with their partners. This is not
surprising, although it is difficult to determine what this may mean in terms of these
women’s experience with domestic abuse without analyzing the issue further.
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4. Model Selection
I use the NSFH data to analyze the relationship between a woman’s working
status and her experience with domestic violence. The model selection procedure
discussed in section 2 is run on both “low income” and “high income” households to
see if the relationship differs by family background.
Because the fully specified model outlined in section 2 is not identified using
standard modeling techniques we can only test models which are partially nested.
Thus, three different model specifications will be tested. The baseline model will test
whether a woman’s temptation to enter the workforce and the underlying state of the
relationship have any effect on one another. The second model tests whether abuse
has any effect on whether a woman chooses to work. Finally, the third model tests
whether a woman working has any effect on whether she experiences abuse. It is
obvious based on theory that each of these models could be justified, thus the model
selection procedure to be carried out will give us a better idea of which relationship is
best fits the data.
A bivariate probit model is run initially to see if there is a significant
correlation between the error terms in the domestic violence and working status
equations. If no such correlation is found, then two separate probit models may be run
without loss of efficiency.
In order to identify each equation in the system, a set of excluded exogenous
variables is required for both equations. In the domestic violence equation, state-level
variables indicating whether unilateral divorce is allowed as well as the ratio of single
men to single women are included. These variables should only affect the welfare
decision indirectly through how they affect the level of violence and the woman’s
outside option. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006), for example, found that the presence of
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unilateral divorce laws significantly decreased domestic violence rates, making it a
promising candidate for an excluded exogenous variable. The relative supply and
demand of single men to women should also affect domestic violence rates because it
measures one of the woman’s outside options. Women who have better options
outside of the relationship should be less willing to tolerate abuse. The higher this
ratio is then, the greater the likelihood the woman can find another partner if she
should leave her current relationship. Thus, we expect the effect of this ratio on
domestic violence rates to be negative.
Further, we might expect these variables to have differing effects for women
in higher and lower income households. Women in higher income households likely
have better access to the resources necessary to carry out divorce proceedings and
thus the impact of unilateral divorce laws is likely higher for them. Similarly, women
in higher income households, working or not, likely enjoy an increased ability to
attract potential partners and so we might expect the effect of the ratio of single men
to single women to have a stronger impact for women in higher income households.
Also included in the domestic violence equation is a set of dummy variables
indicating the religion observed by the household. A set of dummies is used in lieu of
a simple indicator of religious affiliation because views on gender roles likely differ
across religions. For this analysis atheist is treated as the excluded dummy. A small
literature has examined the relationship between religion and domestic violence and it
is typically found that regular attendance of religious gatherings has an inverse
relationship with domestic violence rates. Ellison and Anderson (2002), for example,
use the NSFH to analyze this relationship and find that even after controlling for
various individual and social factors that may affect violence, regular attendance
negatively affects violence rates.
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The employment status equation contains information on whether the
respondent’s mother worked while she was growing up. Blau and Ferber (1991) for
example find that women’s labor force participation does significantly depend on
family background and suggest that having a mother who worked a significant portion
of the years her children were growing up provides motivation for women to pursue
higher education and a career.
Also included in the employment status equation is a state-level variable that
measures the birth rate. It has been shown in numerous studies that there is an inverse
relationship between birth rates and women’s labor force participation (see Mishra
and Smyth [2010] or Bloom et al [2009] for example) suggesting that women may
drop out of the workforce to take care of their children if the birth rate is particularly
high.
Finally, an estimate of the woman’s wage should she choose to work is
included in the employment equation. This predicted wage was generated using CPS
data from the relevant years to create an out-of-sample estimate. Once the wage
equation was estimated with the CPS data, the NSFH data was used to generate a
predicted value4. It is also logical to think that the predicted earnings for women and a
woman’s decision to work are highly correlated with one another and that the
direction of this relationship depends on whether the income or substitution effects are
greater. If the predicted wage of given a number of hours worked per week is high, we
may see that an increase in the wage rate actually decreases women’s labor force
participation on average. Similarly, if the predicted wage given a number of hours

4

The excluded exogenous variable in this estimation strategy was the log average earnings of women
in the respondent’s state.
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worked per week is low, we may see that an increase in the wage rate increases
women’s labor force participation (see Mincer [1962]).
Table 1.2 presents the key results of the model selection procedure. A more
detailed discussion of the results will be deferred until the most appropriate model for
the data has been chosen.
4.1 Baseline Model
The first model estimated that

. In other words, we are estimating

whether the temptation to enter the workforce affects violence rates as well as
whether the underlying state of the relationship affects women’s labor force
participation. Recall that due to the nature of the variables of interest W* and D*, the
model estimated is a reduced form model. Since the coefficients

and

are

estimated using different combinations of coefficients on the excluded exogenous
variables there will be multiple estimates for each coefficient. A X2 test is run on
these estimates to test whether they are equal to each other and whether they are
jointly equal to zero.
Immediately we see that regardless of income level the temptation to work and
the underlying state of the relationship do not appear to significantly affect one
another. We do, however, observe an indirect relationship between our two variables
of interest through the correlation of their error terms. In both the low and high
income groups there appears to be a positive correlation between the error terms
implying that unobservable factors that affect working status also positively affect
domestic violence and vice versa. Because of this significant correlation, the bivariate
probit model is indeed appropriate.
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For more detailed information on the results of this model, see Table 2A.1 in
the Appendix.
4.2 Domestic Violence Effect
In the next model the assumption that

is relaxed by allowing domestic

violence to have a direct effect on whether a woman chooses to work. Further,
because both

and

were found to be insignificant in the baseline model they have

been excluded from estimation and no reduced form estimation is necessary.
We can see that while domestic violence has a negative effect on working for
both income groups, we cannot conclude that this effect is significantly different from
zero. However, like the baseline model, we do conclude that there is an indirect
relationship between the two variables of interest through the correlation of their error
terms and that the bivariate probit model is picking up on that and correcting for it.
Finally, we can see from the full results that are found in Table 2A.2 in the
appendix that both equations do have significant excluded exogenous variables in
both income groups. For domestic violence it appears that religion has strong
predictive power (almost all religion dummies were negative and significant),
suggesting that strong religious beliefs are associated with lower domestic violence
rates which is consistent with the findings of Ellison and Anderson (2002). For
employment status, higher predicted wages for women appear to increase the
likelihood of a woman being employed.
4.3 The Employment Effect
In the last model we relax the assumption that

by allowing a woman’s

employment status to affect the likelihood of abuse. Similar to the previous model, we
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are assuming that the temptation to work and the underlying state of the relationship
have no effect.
This time we see that a woman’s choice to work does have a significant
impact on the likelihood that she will experience abuse in both income groups and this
impact is positive for low income households and negative for high income
households. Further, both equations do have significant excluded exogenous variables
for both income groups indicating that our system is indeed identified. Finally, we
cannot reject that the correlation between the error terms is zero, thus necessitating the
bivariate probit model again.
Upon analyzing the results of all three model specifications we can reject the
baseline model relative to both the working effect and domestic violence effect
models through a likelihood ratio test. In addition, we see that the working effect and
domestic violence effect models produce almost identical log likelihoods, but because
the variables of interest are only significant in the working effect model and because
of the significance of a greater number of excluded exogenous variables we reject the
domestic violence effect model in favor of the working effect model. Thus, we arrive
at the conclusion that the preferred model based on the model selection exercise is:
(9)
(10)

where

and

are distributed joint normally.
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5. Results
Estimates of the coefficients for the preferred model can again be found in
Table 2.3 and corresponding estimates of each variable’s marginal effect can be found
in Table 2.4.
5.1 Low Income Households
The results for the low income household group indicate that there is a strong
positive relationship between a woman working and her experience of domestic
violence. Specifically, working increases the likelihood that a woman will be a victim
of abuse by a factor of 3.3. This implies that for the average woman, the likelihood of
abuse increases from just over 6 percent to just under 20 percent if she chooses to
work, ceteris paribus, which is quite a substantial effect.
There are several possible reasons why we might observe this particular
relationship. Among them is the possibility that men with lower incomes may feel
increased pressure to provide for their families and may feel a sense of shame if his
spouse or partner enters the workforce in order to increase the household income
level. This shame could then manifest itself in the form of abuse. Further, since
women who are with partners with lower incomes typically have characteristics that
make them less able to find employment with high wages (i.e. lower education
levels), working may not provide sufficient resources needed to leave the relationship
if necessary, and therefore abuse could be used as an effective deterrent for future
work.
Also of note is the fact that both equations have several significant excluded
exogenous variables, indicating that the model is properly identified. For domestic
violence, the religious preference of the spouse appears to matter a great deal. Most
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religious denomination dummies were significant and had a negative impact on
domestic violence. The respondent’s state of birth having a unilateral divorce law was
also found to significantly reduce the likelihood of abuse.
For working status, having a mother that worked while she was growing up
increased the likelihood that the respondent also worked. Having such a role model
while growing up likely created similar ambitions in the respondent as Balu and
Ferber (1991) point out.
Finally, the correlation between the error terms in the two equations is quite
high (0.885) and the hypothesis that the correlation is equal to zero can be rejected,
thus the bivariate probit model is justified.
5.2 High Income Households
While a woman being employed had a positive effect on the likelihood of
domestic violence for women in low income households, it has a substantial negative
effect for women in high income households. Specifically, working decreases the
likelihood that a woman will become a victim of abuse by a factor of 5.6 which
implies that for the average woman, the likelihood of being abused would drop from
about 4 percent to 0.7 percent ceteris paribus. In other words, entering the workforce
will nearly eliminate the possibility of abuse for the average woman in a high income
household.
The fact that working has a negative effect on abuse for women in high
income households but a positive effect for women in low income households seems
to suggest something about attitudes about women in the workforce as well as
differences in the outside options for women in these two income groups. Presumably
money issues are less of a problem in high income households, and therefore a
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woman choosing to work is likely not seen as a failure to provide for his family on the
part of the male, but as an expression of the woman’s choice to enter the workforce.
As a result, he is less likely to respond to her decision with violence. Indeed, we also
see that for women in higher income households, an increase in the proportion of
women working drastically reduces the likelihood that she will be abused which
suggests that men with higher incomes appear to be more tolerant of women’s
changing roles in the economy.
On the other hand money issues are often a bone of contention within lower
income households. If a woman chooses to enter the workforce in this situation, the
male may interpret this as a sign that she thinks that he is not doing an adequate job of
providing for his family and may retaliate with violence. Unlike with the high income
households, having an increase in the proportion of women in the workforce has no
impact on the likelihood of abuse for women in low income households, suggesting
that the male’s attitude toward women in the workforce is not necessarily a function
of what is considered the norm in society.
Further, we also suggested earlier that women in higher income households
likely have better outside options. We saw that they were typically more educated and
because of this they are likely more able to earn incomes at least as high as the
average, and they are also likely better able to attract new partners should they leave.
Because their outside options are better, we think this will reduce the likelihood that
the spouse/partner will become abusive. Comparing the results from both the low and
high income household samples enables us to see just that. A one unit increase in the
ratio of single men to single women reduces the likelihood of being victimized by a
factor of 2.7 for women in high income households, but has no significant effect for
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low income households, suggesting that indeed these women are probably more likely
to find a new partner if they chose to, thus deterring any violent acts by her partner.
Again we see that both equations have significant excluded exogenous
variables. For domestic violence the ratio of single men to single women matters as
well as the religious affiliation of the spouse. For employment status, the predicted
wage for the respondent appears to matter. Finally, because we can reject the
hypothesis that the correlation between the error terms in both equations is zero, the
bivariate probit model is also valid for the high income group.
5.3 Robustness Check
As a robustness check, the sample was divided into three income groups
instead of two to see if the results were robust to changes in the income cutoff points.
A similar model selection procedure was carried out at each income level and it was
found that the preferred model for each income level was still one in which
employment impacted domestic violence but not vice versa. Coefficients of the
preferred model can be found in Table 2.5. Note that these should be compared to the
coefficient estimates of the two-income group model specification found in Table 2.3.
The relationship between employment status and domestic violence is still
preserved despite the different household income thresholds. Employment appears to
have a strong positive influence for both the low and middle income levels, yet a
strong negative influence for the high income level. While the excluded exogenous
variables do lose some of their predictive power, these results are consistent with what
was found earlier, suggesting that the results are indeed robust to changes in the cutoff
point.
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6. Conclusion
The findings of this study are worrying in light of the push to provide more
jobs to women in an effort to promote gender equality. They suggest that such efforts
may have unintended consequences on the women they are aimed at helping in the
form of the risk of increased domestic violence. This paper has shown that women
who are in relationships with lower income spouses are actually more likely to
become victims of abuse if they enter the workforce. Conversely women who are in
relationships with higher income men become less likely to be victimized by entering
the workforce.
These results are consistent with models that posit that males may use violence
as an instrument to control their wives and to regain the dominant role in the
household. Women in lower income households are more likely to have lower outside
options, and thus less bargaining power to begin with. By entering the workforce,
these women may see an increase in their outside options by entering the workforce,
but not enough to effectively allow them to leave the relationship if it becomes
abusive. On the other hand, women in higher income households are likely to have
higher initial outside options, and thus more bargaining power. Working will also
increase their bargaining power, but it has greater potential to raise their bargaining
power sufficiently to actually deter violence.
The findings of this study suggest that programs aimed at providing work
opportunities for women, particularly those of lower skill levels, may need to have
supplementary programs that target domestic abuse as well such as access to
counseling, women’s shelters, and perhaps educational programs aimed at boosting
these women’s outside options.
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Tables

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (All Waves)

Variable
Domestic Violence
Working
Age
Education
Number of Children
Log Spouse Income
Black
Hispanic
Cohabiting
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
% Females Working
Mother Worked
Birth Rate
Log Female Earnings
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio

Average Value
(Low Income Households)
0.063
(0.242)
0.912
(0.283)
43.715
(13.081)
11.731
(4.106)
2.197
(1.612)
5.542
(4.641)
0.167
(0.373)
0.071
(0.256)
0.057
(0.232)
0.174
(0.379)
0.399
(0.490)
0.133
(0.340)
5.733
(1.344)
0.726
(0.054)
0.533
(0.499)
14.965
(2.014)
9.235
(0.355)
0.543
(0.498)
1.088
(0.059)
2920

Number of Observations
Notes:
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Income values in constant 1988 dollars.

Average Value
(High Income Households)
0.041
(0.199)
0.929
(0.257)
42.312
(10.437)
13.279
(3.207)
2.223
(1.705)
10.723
(0.494)
0.147
(0.354)
0.049
(0.215)
0.032
(0.175)
0.205
(0.404)
0.370
(0.483)
0.125
(0.331)
5.700
(1.278)
0.727
(0.052)
0.537
(0.499)
14.991
(1.951)
9.218
(0.328)
0.512
(0.500)
1.091
(0.060)
3070
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Table 2.2: Model Selection Procedure Summary
Variable
Baseline Model
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly equal to 0)
p-value in parentheses
W* (X2 test: estimates jointly equal to 0)
p-value in parentheses
Number of Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test of Rho=0:
Domestic Violence Effect Model
Domestic Violence
X2 test:
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0
p-values in parentheses
Number of Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test of Rho=0:
Working Effect Model
Working

Low Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)

High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)

(0.466)
(0.925)
N = 2920
L = -1380.7
Rho = 0.213

(0.700)
(0.906)

p-value = 0.027

N = 3070
L = -1175.2
Rho = -0.241

-0.602
(0.735)
(0.000)
N = 2920
L = -1408.7
Rho = 0.351
1.739***
(0.107)

(0.490)

p-value = 0.032

p-value = 0.007
-1.213
(0.914)

(0.000)
N = 3070
L = -1192.1
Rho = -0.613

(0.124)

p-value = 0.021

-2.163**
(1.023)

X2 test:
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0
(0.000)
(0.009)
(0.000)
p-values in parentheses
Number of Observations
N = 2920
N = 3070
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -1398.0
L = -1191.8
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.885
p-value = 0.000
Rho = -0.508
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.

(0.048)

p-value = 0.000
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Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates of Preferred Model (Working Effect)
Variable
Working
Age
Education
Number of Children
Black
Hispanic
Cohabiting
Log Spouse Income
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
% Women Working
Wave 2
Wave 3
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion
Working:
Mother Worked
Birth Rate
Predicted Wage

Low Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
1.739***
(0.107)
-0.011***
0.008
(0.003)
(0.005)
-0.001
0.024
(0.007)
(0.018)
0.016
0.004
(0.019)
(0.023)
-0.012
-0.078
(0.080)
(0.085)
0.163
-0.075
(0.110)
(0.116)
0.948***
0.069
(0.105)
(0.132)
-0.006
0.010
(0.008)
(0.008)
-0.176*
0.179*
(0.091)
(0.097)
-0.154**
0.065
(0.074)
(0.078)
-0.282***
0.267**
(0.105)
(0.113)
-0.003
0.026
(0.028)
(0.030)
-0.479
1.112*
(0.827)
(0.623)
0.043
0.047
(0.079)
(0.089)
0.161*
-0.015
(0.142)
(0.149)

-0.056*
(0.028)
-0.206
(0.320)
***

High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
-2.163**
(1.023)
-0.018***
-0.005
(0.004)
(0.004)
-0.008
0.010
(0.012)
(0.012)
-0.005
0.002
(0.026)
(0.028)
0.125
0.050
(0.120)
(0.134)
0.167
-0.156
(0.237)
(0.158)
1.817***
0.181
(0.210)
(0.303)
-0.028
-0.084
(0.094)
(0.069)
0.042
0.164*
(0.102)
(0.098)
-0.197*
0.067
(0.110)
(0.093)
0.045
0.181*
(0.123)
(0.108)
0.013
-0.004
(0.035)
(0.032)
-1.885*
0.118
(1.113)
(0.957)
0.275**
0.138*
(0.117)
(0.095)
0.434***
0.216
(0.133)
(0.154)

-0.010
(0.097)
1.055*
(0.600)
***
0.071**
(0.033)
-0.006
(0.009)
-0.268
(0.175)

0.015
(0.087)
0.010
(0.026)
0.513***
(0.151)

X2 test:
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0
(0.000)
(0.009)
(0.000)
(0.048)
(p-values in parentheses)
Number of Observations
N = 2920
N = 3070
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -1398.0
L = -1191.8
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.885
p-value = 0.000
Rho = -0.508
p-value = 0.000
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Table 2.4: Marginal Effects Estimates of Preferred Model (Working Effect)
Low Income Households
High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
Working
3.260***
-5.554**
(0.223)
(2.511)
Age
-0.023***
4.30x10-4
-0.045***
-0.001
(0.006)
(4.82x10-4)
(0.011)
(0.001)
Education
-0.002
-2.82x10-4
-0.020
0.001
(0.016)
(0.001)
(0.031)
(0.002)
Number of Children
0.038
-0.004
-0.013
2.59x10-4
(0.035)
(0.003)
(0.067)
(0.004)
Black
-0.005
-0.011
0.322
0.007
(0.136)
(0.013)
(0.307)
(0.019)
Hispanic
0.319*
-0.012
0.429
-0.023
(0.173)
(0.019)
(0.607)
(0.023)
Cohabiting
1.781***
0.013
4.667***
0.026
(0.287)
(0.024)
(0.607)
(0.044)
Log Spouse Income
-0.013
0.002
-0.071
-0.012
(0.013)
(0.001)
(0.242)
(0.010)
Northeast
-0.331
0.025
0.107
0.024*
(0.212)
(0.019)
(0.263)
(0.014)
South
-0.296**
0.009
-0.505*
0.010
(0.137)
(0.015)
(0.287)
(0.013)
West
-0.535***
0.045**
0.117
0.026*
(0.203)
(0.020)
(0.315)
(0.016)
Unemployment Rate
-0.005
0.005
0.034
-0.001
(0.056)
(0.005)
(0.090)
(0.005)
% Women Working
-0.915
0.245*
-4.841*
0.017
(1.747)
(0.130)
(2.567)
(0.140)
Wave 2
0.078
0.019
0.705**
0.020*
(0.144)
(0.015)
(0.307)
(0.012)
Wave 3
0.387*
-0.001
1.115***
0.031
(0.224)
(0.022)
(0.350)
(0.022)
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
-0.105*
-0.025
(0.042)
(0.249)
Single Sex Ratio
-0.465
2.709*
(0.594)
(1.546)
Religion
***
***
Working:
Mother Worked
0.012**
0.002
(0.007)
(0.013)
Birth Rate
-0.001
0.001
(0.002)
(0.004)
Predicted Wage
-0.038
0.088***
(0.027)
(0.025)
Number of Observations
N = 2920
N = 3070
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -1396.7
L = -1191.8
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = -0.985 p-value = 0.000
Rho = 0.804
p-value = 0.000
Notes:
All marginal effects are partial elasticities of the form dlogPr(y=1)/dx and are the sum of the direct
and indirect effects when applicable.
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence
equation. The significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
Variable

Table 2.5: Robustness Check Coefficient Estimates (Working Effect by 3 Income Levels)

Variable
Working
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion
Working:
Mother Worked
Birth Rate
Predicted Wage

Low Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
1.723***
(0.133)

-0.070
(0.049)
-0.247
(0.485)
***

Middle Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
1.666***
(0.145)

0.043
(0.059)
-0.026
(0.393)
***
0.069
(0.047)
0.017
(0.021)
0.208
(0.185)

High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
-3.155***
(0.105)

-0.119
(0.093)
0.780
(0.822)
***
0.034
(0.061)
0.017
(0.021)
0.525***
(0.201)

0.007
(0.102)
-0.028
(0.019)
0.427**
(0.175)

X2 test:
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0
(0.000)
(0.3534)
(0.000)
(0.065)
(0.000)
(0.034)
(p-values in parentheses)
Number of Observations
N = 2095
N = 1809
N = 2086
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -1003.4
L = -766.6
L = -770.7
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.723
p-value = 0.008 Rho = 0.798
p-value = 0.048
Rho = -0.327
p-value = 0.000
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The significance test is a test of all dummies
being jointly equal to 0.
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Appendix: Full Results of Model Selection

Table 2A.1: Model Selection Coefficient Estimates (Baseline Model)
Variable
D* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0)

Low Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
(0.466)

High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
(0.700)

W* (X2 test: estimates jointly = 0)

(0.925)

Age

-0.022***
(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.007)
0.021
(0.028)
-0.076
(0.105)
0.227
(0.156)
1.457***
(0.201)
-0.003
(0.009)
-0.163
(0.113)
-0.217**
(0.109)
-0.299*
(0.163)
0.013
(0.044)
0.136
(1.119)
0.341***
(0.120)
0.554***
(0.204)

0.002
(0.003)
-0.008
(0.009)
-0.023
(0.019)
-0.068
(0.084)
-0.066
(0.129)
0.082
(0.136)
0.003
(0.008)
0.056
(0.115)
0.021
(0.077)
0.228*
(0.135)
0.019
(0.029)
1.774*
(1.075)
0.173*
(0.089)
0.129
(0.175)

-0.017***
(0.005)
-0.010
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.028)
0.118
(0.126)
0.145
(0.258)
1.891***
(0.214)
-0.027
(0.087)
0.051
(0.110)
-0.191
(0.117)
0.031
(0.134)
0.028
(0.036)
-2.548*
(1.555)
0.253**
(0.120)
0.384**
(0.179)

-0.004
(0.004)
0.007
(0.012)
0.003
(0.030)
0.045
(0.132)
-0.070
(0.151)
0.202
(0.252)
-0.087
(0.070)
0.084
(0.095)
0.025
(0.099)
0.183
(0.120)
-0.013
(0.030)
0.504
(0.928)
0.164*
(0.097)
0.253
(0.167)

-0.116
(0.090)
-0.184
(0.932)
***

-0.161
(0.098)
0.455
(0.582)
*

0.002
(0.101)
1.068*
(0.645)
***

-0.131
(0.085)
0.586
(0.601)
**

Education
Number of Children
Black
Hispanic
Cohabiting
Log Spouse Income
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
% Women Working
Wave 2
Wave 3
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion
Working:
Mother Worked
Birth Rate
Predicted Wage

0.061
(0.092)
0.004
(0.030)
-0.157
(0.225)
N = 2920
L = -1380.7
Rho = 0.213

(0.906)

-0.007
(0.054)
0.008
(0.054)
-0.305
(0.188)

0.050
(0.085)
-0.013
(0.020)
0.108
(0.198)
N = 3070
L = -1175.2
Rho = -0.241

0.004
(0.091)
0.016
(0.025)
0.412**
(0.168)

Number of Observations
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald test of Rho=0:
p-value = 0.027
p-value = 0.007
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Table 2A.2: Model Selection Coefficient Estimates (Domestic Violence Effect Model)
Variable
Domestic Violence
Age
Education
Number of Children
Black
Hispanic
Cohabiting
Log Spouse Income
Northeast
South
West
Unemployment Rate
% Women Working
Wave 2
Wave 3
Excluded Exogenous Variables
Domestic Violence:
Unilateral Divorce
Single Sex Ratio
Religion
Working:
Mother Worked
Birth Rate
Predicted Wage

Low Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
-0.602
(0.735)
-0.022***
0.002
(0.004)
(0.003)
-0.014**
-0.007
(0.007)
(0.009)
0.021
-0.017
(0.029)
(0.019)
-0.053
-0.060
(0.115)
(0.081)
0.210
-0.066
(0.149)
(0.121)
1.455***
0.286
(0.201)
(0.267)
-2.91x10-4
0.006
(0.007)
(0.008)
-0.174
0.138
(0.113)
(0.106)
-0.202*
0.032
(0.106)
(0.082)
-0.314**
0.190
(0.154)
(0.126)
0.012
0.022
(0.045)
(0.028)
-0.087
1.212*
(1.126)
(0.723)
0.313***
0.192*
(0.112)
(0.101)
0.445***
0.174
(0.127)
(0.196)

-0.088
(0.094)
-0.130
(0.938)
***

High Income Households
Coefficient
Coefficient
(D.V. Eq.)
(Working Eq.)
-1.213
(0.914)
-0.018***
-0.005
(0.005)
(0.004)
-0.012
0.009
(0.014)
(0.012)
-0.010
0.004
(0.027)
(0.032)
0.120
0.052
(0.120)
(0.131)
0.191
-0.088
(0.259)
(0.152)
1.895***
0.697
(0.218)
(0.490)
-0.030
-0.076
(0.097)
(0.070)
0.039
0.136
(0.105)
(0.099)
-0.200*
0.040
(0.113)
(0.092)
-0.004
0.180
(0.139)
(0.112)
0.030
-0.017
(0.036)
(0.029)
-2.245*
0.085
(1.356)
(0.887)
0.281**
0.166*
(0.122)
(0.095)
0.479***
0.222
(0.144)
(0.158)

0.016
(0.099)
0.994
(0.618)
***
0.009
(0.052)
0.008
(0.024)
0.292*
(0.169)

0.011
(0.092)
0.009
(0.025)
0.371**
(0.141)

X2 test:
Excluded Exogenous Variables Jointly = 0
(0.000)
(0.490)
(0.000)
(0.124)
p-values in parentheses
Number of Observations
N = 2920
N = 3070
Log pseudolikelihood
L = -1408.7
L = -1192.1
Wald test of Rho=0:
Rho = 0.351
p-value = 0.032
Rho = -0.613
p-value = 0.021
Notes:
Robust standard errors clustered on birth state in parentheses unless otherwise noted.
Individual dummies indicating religious denomination were also included in the domestic violence equation. The
significance test is a test of all dummies being jointly equal to 0.
All Income values are in constant 1988 dollars.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.
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Chapter 3: “Do the Job Satisfaction Returns to Education Differ Between Black
and White Workers?”

Introduction
The gap in educational attainment between races has been an issue that
policymakers have been attempting to address for the past several decades, and while
large strides have been made to close the gap a large disparity still exists. Institutions
emerged in recent decades that attempt to close this gap in educational attainment
(scholarship programs, grants, affirmative action educational policies etc.) and have
met with obvious success in increasing the overall percentage of minorities holding
degrees. In fact the percentage of black workers who held a bachelor’s degree has
more than doubled since 1980, but there is still a disparity of over 10 percentage
points between black and white individuals holding a bachelor’s degree (Digest of
Education Statistics, 2009). Since the gap does not appear to be closing, an important
question to ask is whether other factors that these institutions do not address are
affecting the educational decisions of minorities.
This paper attempts to analyze the returns to education and how the returns
differ between black and white workers in an attempt to explain why the educational
attainment gap does not appear to be closing. Thus far the literature has focused on
the difference in the monetary returns to education between blacks and whites. The
general consensus is that black workers tend to earn higher monetary returns to
education than white workers. If this were the case, black workers would have more
incentive to invest in higher levels of education than white workers, and through the
emergence of institutions that seek to increase access to blacks and other minorities
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we would expect that the gap in educational attainment would be decreasing. This
clearly is not the case.
One potential reason why the estimated returns to education to date are not
consistent with the observed gap in educational attainment is that the monetary returns
to education are only one part of the story. While increasing one’s earnings potential
is likely the primary motivator for pursuing higher education, other considerations
also exist. Higher education is often sought by individuals to enable them to find a
more satisfying job and it is likely that educational attainment affects job satisfaction
differently for black and white workers. Since job satisfaction measures how satisfied
one is with not only the pay but the other aspects of the job, it may be a better
candidate to measure the returns to education by. If black individuals are found to
have lower job satisfaction returns to education on average then this may at least
partially explain why we still observe a sizable gap in educational attainment between
races. After all, a person might not choose to spend four more years in school if they
would be happier at their current job.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature on the racial differences in
the monetary returns to education to a more general measure: the job satisfaction
returns to education. Ultimately the results of the analysis carried out indicate that
black workers do indeed have lower job satisfaction returns to education than white
workers. In fact, education has a negative net impact for black workers after
approximately a high school diploma is received, which suggest that there is little
incentive for blacks to invest further in education beyond the high school level which
is consistent with the observed attainment gap.
Further, we find that education has a positive impact on the ability to transition
into new employment where job satisfaction is higher for white workers, but very
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little net impact on this ability to transition to a new better job for black workers. This
finding offers further evidence that hints at why blacks do indeed choose lower levels
of education than whites on average.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Part 2 provides a brief
review of the relevant literature, Part 3 discusses the data and methodology that will
be used, Part 4 presents the results of the study, and Part 5 concludes.

1. Literature Review
1.1 Monetary Returns to Education
A large part of the decision to invest in education is arguably whether the
monetary benefits to investing outweigh the costs. If education is too costly and does
not yield a wage that is sufficiently higher than one’s current wage, there are no
incentives for the individual to invest. The monetary returns to education literature
consistently finds positive returns to education, though the magnitudes of these
returns vary from study to study (see Card [1999] for example).
The analysis of the monetary returns to education has also been carried out
across different demographic groups including across races. Interestingly, the
literature indicates that black individuals have higher monetary returns to education
than their white counterparts (see Welch [1973] for example). This idea has also been
analyzed using sheepskin effects instead of simply using years of education. Belman
and Heywood (1991), for example, find that black and other minority workers tend to
have higher returns to signals of high productivity, namely higher levels of education,
than their white counterparts and the reverse is true for signals of low productivity
(low education levels). Regardless of which method of analysis is used, the
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conclusion remains the same. Black workers tend to have higher monetary returns to
education than white workers.
If this truly is the case, and the monetary returns to education are the only
basis for making educational level decisions, then this literature would predict that
black individuals would have higher incentives to invest in human capital than white
individuals. Further, since scholarship and grant programs, among other institutions,
have actively increased access to education for blacks and other minority groups for
the past several decades, we would expect that the gap in attainment should have
narrowed, but as we have seen this is not the case. There must be other factors in
addition to the monetary returns that individuals are taking into account when making
their educational decisions, such as the ability to do more interesting work, better
fringe benefits, or better working conditions. Thus, an analysis based on a composite
variable that takes all of these factors into account would give us a much more
complete picture. This paper has argued that a candidate for such a variable is job
satisfaction.
1.2 Education and Job Satisfaction
Job Satisfaction returns to education are arguably more useful in the decisionmaking process in that the wage premium associated with higher levels of education
may be misleading; it is very possible that higher education levels could produce large
monetary gains, but the work itself is not satisfying at all. The education premium on
job satisfaction might therefore be more useful in explaining patters in individual
choices about education levels. Clearly there are some valid concerns with using job
satisfaction, a subjective variable, to evaluate the “returns to education”, but as
Hamermesh (2001: p.2) points out “Any study of nonwage monetary or even
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nonmonetary returns will necessarily ignore some non-pecuniary aspects of these
returns…Only one measure, the satisfaction that workers derive from their jobs, might
be viewed as reflecting how they react to the entire changing panoply of job
characteristics.” If we think that low levels of job satisfaction may induce workers to
change certain behaviors (i.e. to go back to school or to seek a new job), then the
effects of education on job satisfaction, while an imperfect measure, will at least
provide a more realistic picture of the education level decision.
An important factor in determining the effects of education on job satisfaction
is individual expectations. The way in which individuals form their expectations of
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to education will influence whether or not higher
levels of education will actually result in higher levels of job satisfaction. It is
generally thought that increased levels of education increase the expectations of
individuals on the various rewards of a job and that higher levels of these rewards are
needed to satisfy them, but that education also increases one’s ability to obtain a job
with these characteristics (Martin and Shehan, 1989). Depending on whether these
expectations are met, education may have a positive or negative effect on job
satisfaction, and we may also think that these expectations differ by race.
It may be reasonable to assume that a black and a white worker with similar
characteristics and the same education level would expect the same job
characteristics. However, their ability to obtain jobs with these characteristics may be
different either because of discrimination in the labor market or differences in job
searching ability.
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1.3 Race and Job Satisfaction
Although determinants of job satisfaction may be different across races, few
studies have analyzed the job satisfaction gap between blacks and whites. Instead
most have focused on the differences in job satisfaction between other demographic
groups such as men and women, although many studies include an indicator variable
for race. In the U.K. Clark and Oswald (1996) and Sloane and Williams (2000) find
that black workers tend to have lower levels of job satisfaction than white workers,
but only Sloane and Williams find race to be significant in predicting job satisfaction.
Bartel (1981) and Clark (1997) on the other hand find that black workers enjoy higher
levels of job satisfaction on average. Using U.S. data, Bartel finds that race has
become more important over time in predicting job satisfaction while Clark finds that
race is insignificant in predicting job satisfaction.
Bartel (1981) which analyzes the differences in job satisfaction across races,
but does not allow education’s effects on job satisfaction to vary by race. She
estimates probits over a period of time on pooled data and attempts to estimate the
effect of race on the full wage (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) and the direct effect of
race on job satisfaction. The results of Bartel’s study suggest that the effect of race on
job satisfaction is positive (as predicted) and that race is becoming increasingly more
important in predicting job satisfaction. Interestingly education’s effects on job
satisfaction levels in this model, with the exception of the earliest time period, are all
positive and insignificant; in the first period education’s returns to job satisfaction are
negative and significant.
Clearly a consensus has yet to be reached in the literature not only on the
direction of the effects of race on job satisfaction, but whether race is even significant
in determining job satisfaction levels as well.
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2. Data and Methodology
The data used in this study is from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979, using the survey years between 1989 and 2002 (10 years in total). Throughout
the survey years included, the range of ages was between 24 and 45: individuals who
were just starting their careers as well as individuals who were well established in
their careers. In this survey, the question pertaining to job satisfaction is phrased as
follows: “How do/did you feel about your job/assignment with (employer)? Do/did
you like it very much, like it fairly well, dislike it somewhat, or dislike it very much?”
In order to obtain easily interpretable results, the response values were reduced to a
binary variable taking a value of 1 if an individual reported liking their job very much,
and a value of 0 otherwise.5 Education in this data set is measured as the total number
of completed years of education and these values range from zero to twenty years.
Other variables are included to control for determinants of pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards, as well as personal and work related characteristics. The sample
used has been restricted to include only black and white workers who are not selfemployed. Summary statistics for the variables can be found in Table 1.
Note that the binary job satisfaction score was also compared at different
levels of education: no high school (NO HS), high school diploma (HS), some college
(SC), bachelor’s degree (B), and graduate work (G). These categories were
determined by the years of schooling completed and were grouped as follows: <12
years, 12 years, between 12 and 16 years, and >16 years respectively. Thus it is not
certain that a degree was actually obtained, if applicable. Education levels are also
5

The binary job satisfaction variable is defined in this way because most job satisfaction scores were
3’s and 4’s and almost the entire sample was evenly split between the two scores, thus not much is lost
in using a binary variable. Several ordered probit models were run to check whether the results still
hold and the results were found to be nearly identical to the ones used for this analysis. For ease of
interpretation the results of the probit models will be reported, but the results of the ordered probit
models are also available upon request.
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compared at both job satisfaction levels. These comparisons can also be found in
Table 3.1.
We can clearly see that white workers are more satisfied than black workers
on average and that white workers are more likely to receive higher wages.
Conversely black workers are more likely to be members of unions, which has
typically been found to correspond to lower levels of job satisfaction (see Artz [2010]
for example). We can also observe that for every education level, except no high
school education, white workers have higher levels of job satisfaction than black
workers and that average job satisfaction is not strictly increasing in educational
attainment, but it is uncertain whether this is due to the effects of education or if it is a
result of differences in average earnings, benefits, and/or other characteristics between
black and white workers.
Various probit models were run to examine the interaction between education
and job satisfaction. The first four are baseline models that allow us to compare our
estimates of education and race’s effects on job satisfaction with those found in the
larger literature. Models 5 through 8 also include an interacted term for education and
race. This allows us to see the differences in education’s effects on job satisfaction
between races and to see how race’s impact on job satisfaction varies across education
levels.6 Finally, a set of other regressions indicate the robustness of the education-race
relationships to other variable specifications.

6

Equivalent models were run using splines at several “educational milestones” or degree levels as
defined in the summary statistics discussion that follows. The end results indicated that the effect of
education does not change by degree level, even for the very basic initial models. Thus, the story seems
to be a years of schooling story instead of a degree level story.
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3. Results
3.1 Basic Results
Table 3.2 contains the results of the four baseline specifications. The first
model estimated simply measures the relationship between education, race, and job
satisfaction using a probit model that controls only for gender and age. Model 2 adds
controls for personal characteristics to see if the relationship persists after controlling
for marital status, whether the respondent lives in a rural or urban area, and family
size. Models 3 and 4 add in monetary and non-monetary work related characteristics,
respectively. Since the variable specifications here are similar to ones found in the
literature, the results of these models can also be compared with those of the literature
to see if the findings are consistent.
All four models estimate a negative and significant effect of race on job
satisfaction. This result is fairly consistent with the majority of the literature on job
satisfaction. In general, being black has been found to be negatively related to job
satisfaction, though most estimates have been insignificant (see Sloane and Williams
[2000], or Clark, Oswald, and Warr [1996] for example). This negative and
significant effect of race on job satisfaction contrasts, however, with the positive and
significant effects estimated in Bartel’s (1981) earlier work.
We also observe that education has a positive and significant relationship with
job satisfaction in all four specifications. This suggests that education does have an
impact on job satisfaction beyond the ability to “buy” better working conditions. The
literature on education’s impact on job satisfaction has been quite divided with some
researchers finding a positive effect, some finding negative effects, and other finding
insignificant effects. In general we would expect education to increase one’s job
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satisfaction because it increases the ability to obtain better wages, benefits and to do
more interesting work, but once these are controlled for there may be little extra
influence on job satisfaction.
The four baseline models estimate therefore seem consistent with theory and
the existing literature, but what happens when we allow education’s impact to vary by
race? This analysis is shown in Table 3.3. Models 5 through 8 add an interacted term
for race and education to the specifications from Table 3.2.
3.2 Results of Interacted Models
Model 5 shows that the coefficient on the race indicator has switched signs
when the interacted terms are included. This indicates that black workers have a
higher baseline level of job satisfaction (job satisfaction if the individual has no
education) than white workers, but that job satisfaction is decreasing in education for
black workers. In particular we find that being black is positively associated with job
satisfaction until education reaches 6.7-10.1 years, but the effect becomes negative if
education goes beyond that level.7 In other words, if a black individual chooses to
further his/her education beyond the high school level it will actually have a negative
impact on job satisfaction.
This result is consistent with an expectations story. Exposure to higher
education increases one’s expectation of not only the pecuniary aspects of a job, but
the non-pecuniary aspects as well. It could be argued then that black workers’
expectations of these job characteristics are increasing in education to a point that

7

This is determined by finding the level of education at which the marginal effect of the race indicator
and the marginal effect of the interacted term are equal. The range given above is the range of values
obtained when carrying this analysis out for all four model specifications.
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they are not being met, thereby decreasing their satisfaction with their work (see Clark
[1997], and Clark and Oswald [1996] for a discussion on expectations).
Another interesting result of these models is that education’s effect on job
satisfaction is positive and significant for white workers under Models 5 through 7
(and insignificant under Model 8), but the net effect for black workers varies by
model specification. The effect of education for blacks appears to be positive when
only personal characteristics are controlled for, but becomes negative and significant
when we begin to control for work-related characteristics.
This result lends some more support for the idea that expectations are driving
the negative effect of education on job satisfaction for black workers. Because
education is insignificant for white workers in Model 8, education is not adding
anything significant to job satisfaction beyond what it adds to work related
characteristics. Since the interacted term for black workers is significant though, we
see that education still plays a significant role for black workers even after controlling
for work related characteristics. In fact, each additional year of education predicts a
lower probability that a black worker reports being very satisfied with his or her job
by about 1.1 percent. This means that obtaining a bachelor’s degree, something that
typically takes four years or more, could lower his or her chances of being very
satisfied in their job by nearly five percent. This implies that education is still
decreasing job satisfaction for black individuals even after we account for how it
affects job characteristics, which is consistent with unmet expectations about the
worker’s job.
Table 3.3 also includes Wald Tests of whether the education variables are
jointly equal to zero as well as the race variables. The results of these tests indicate
that while education may not be significant in determining job satisfaction for white
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workers in all model specifications, we cannot reject the hypothesis that education
and racial interaction with education are jointly equal to zero under any model
specification.
3.3 Robustness Checks
We saw in the first part of the analysis that even in the midst of numerous
personal and job related characteristics there still exists a significant difference in
education’s effects on job satisfaction between black and white workers. Four
robustness checks were run to see if this relationship persists, the results of which can
be found in Table 3.4.
Model 9 attempts to get at a potential cause of these unmet expectations via
including a term for an individual’s comparison wage. Clark (1996) was among the
first to use comparison earnings in the analysis of job satisfaction and showed that not
only is an individual’s income important in determining job satisfaction, but how the
individual views their income in relation to what he/she believes they deserve (based
on their characteristics) or in relation to what his/her peers earn is also important. A
similar measure is included in this analysis to see if the gap in education’s returns
disappears after accounting for some measure of individual “expectations” of wages.
This comparison wage variable measures the ratio of the respondent’s actual
income and of what the worker would be predicted to earn if he/she were of the
opposite race. The lower the value of this variable (either by a relative decrease in the
individual’s wage or by an increase in the wages of those the individual compares
his/her income to), the lower one’s job satisfaction is expected to be. Baxter (1973,
1993) formalized this idea as relative deprivation. An individual will have some
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expectations of what they should be earning given their education and background,
and if these expectations are not met the worker will be less satisfied on average.
To create this variable, two standard wage regressions are estimated for black
and white workers separately. Predicted wages were then generated for white
individuals using the black earnings equation and similar predicted wages were
created for black individuals. Finally, the ratio of the individual’s actual earnings
versus their predicted earnings if they were of the other race is taken. This ratio is
what is used in the analysis as the comparison wage. Because of colinearity concerns,
this comparison wage will replace the respondent’s actual income in the analysis.
Interestingly, the coefficient on the comparison wage in Model 9 is positive
and significant which agrees with Clark’s (1996) earlier findings, but the relationship
between education, race, and job satisfaction that was estimated in Models 5 through
8 still persists.
Another question that arises is that because blacks have higher levels of job
satisfaction than whites at lower education levels, but the comparison is reversed after
a high school diploma is received, perhaps part of what we are observing is a drop-out
effect. Thus, the second robustness check estimates Model 9 only for individuals who
have completed at least 12 years of education.
The overall result is that our baseline group, individuals with only a high
school diploma, experiences no significant differences in job satisfaction by race. This
result makes sense because we are cutting out those black workers who were, on
average, happier than their white counterparts, and starting at roughly the point where
the two experience the same levels of job satisfaction. We also see that despite the
fact that blacks and whites are starting from roughly equivalent levels of job
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satisfaction, blacks do still receive lower job satisfaction returns to education than
whites.
The third robustness check run follows the work of Clark (1997), and asks if
this persistent result has a gender component to it. The full model is thus run again,
including interactions with gender and education, as well as gender and race. These
results can be found in Table 3.4.
It appears that white women with low levels of education are more satisfied
than their male counterparts, but black women are less satisfied. Further, the results
indicate that women receive lower job satisfaction returns to education than men
which agrees with the earlier findings of Clark (1997). We also notice that black
females have lower levels of job satisfaction than their white counterparts, but that
education’s effect on job satisfaction does not differ for black and white females.
Finally, there is still a persistent difference in the job satisfaction returns to education
between blacks and whites, and it does not appear that this effect varies by gender.
A final robustness check might be to include the AFQT score not only in the
comparison wage equation but in the job satisfaction equation as well and to see if
AFQT scores affect job satisfaction differently by race and/or by gender. Lang and
Manove (2011) show that conditional on ability (AFQT scores) black individuals
invest more in education and as such should out earn their white counterparts.
However, they propose that because of statistical discrimination this does not
necessarily happen. If these results are true, then at least part of the difference in the
job satisfaction returns to education should be explained by differences in ability
which would be consistent with an expectations story.
The results of this final specification can also be found in Table 3.4. We see
that despite controlling for ability, black men have high job satisfaction than white
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men when education and ability are low. However, this advantage in job satisfaction
is gradually depleted as education and ability increase. We also see a similar result to
our previous specification that while there do appear to be some differences between
men and women, this effect does not differ significantly by race, suggesting again that
most of the significant differences in the education returns to job satisfaction are
between black and white men.
Finally, we see that white men enjoy a positive return to education, but receive
lower job satisfaction when they are of higher ability. For black men, however, the net
effect of education is negative, and while they too have lower levels of job
satisfaction as ability increases, this reduction in satisfaction is higher for black men.
These results make sense intuitively in light of Lang and Manove’s (2011)
work. Higher levels of ability tend to lead individuals into higher levels of education,
and if black individuals with a given ability level invest more than their white
counterparts then it is also likely that their expectations of their job will be higher.
Because of statistical discrimination in the hiring process, or other discriminatory
practices in the work place, the expectations of these individuals may be unmet to a
greater degree than their white counterparts and these unmet expectations are likely
manifesting themselves in the form of lower levels of job satisfaction at higher
education levels.

4. Extension: Education’s Effect on the Ability to Transition to a Better Job
Earlier the idea was put forth that individuals may pursue higher education not
only to obtain a better paying job, but to also obtain a job which they are happier with.
We have now seen that education does indeed affect job satisfaction differently for
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blacks and whites, and that black individuals see negative job satisfaction returns to
education. This suggests that black individuals have fewer incentives in terms of job
satisfaction to pursue higher levels of education, presumably because they expect that
they will not see the benefit in the form of a better job, which is why we still observe
a gap in educational attainment between blacks and whites.
A natural extension of these results would be to see how education affects the
ability of an individual to move into a new job where their job satisfaction is higher
and to see if this effect is different by race. To accomplish this, a Cox model of
proportional hazards is run on the data where a “failure” is defined as a person having
a new job at the time of interview and reporting being more satisfied than they were at
their previous job. Here the full job satisfaction variable is used in lieu of the binary
job satisfaction variable used in the previous analysis. Because the ability to transition
to a new job that one likes better is likely higher when one starts at a lower job
satisfaction level (since there are more opportunities for improvement) the Cox model
is stratified by the individual’s current job satisfaction score. Note that because the
sample from each year contains only individuals who were employed at the time of
the interview and had a job to report satisfaction for some individuals are missing data
for one or more survey years and are excluded from the present analysis. Also note
that the analysis does not include those individuals whose job satisfaction scores are
4’s since they are unable to transition to a new job that they like any better. The
results of this model can be found in Table 3.5.
The results indicate that education has a positive effect on the ability to
transition to a new job with higher job satisfaction for white workers. Specifically we
find that for each additional year of education there will be roughly a four percent
increase in the likelihood of moving into a new job with higher job satisfaction. For
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black men, however, education seems to have no net effect on the likelihood of
transition. We also see that there is no significant impact of race on this transition
ability at low levels of education, but the ability to obtain a new better job moves in
opposite directions as education increases with white men being more able and black
men being less able to transition.
A final related analysis would be to see how education affects the initial
placement in jobs of different satisfaction levels differently for black and white
workers. To accomplish this the job placement in the first survey year, 1989, is used
as a proxy for the respondent’s first job and a multinomial probit model is run to
analyze how education affects this initial placement.8 Results of this estimation are
presented in Table 3.6.
We can see that education significantly increases the likelihood of being
placed in a job with a job satisfaction score of a 2 or 3 for black workers relative to a
score of 4, but that education does not significantly impact this placement into less
satisfying jobs for white workers. Further, the predicted probability of being placed in
an “initial” job with a job satisfaction score below 4 is higher for black workers than it
is for white workers at every score, but the predicted probability of being placed in an
initial job with the highest job satisfaction score of 4 is higher for white workers.
These findings support our previous results, and we have now seen that not
only does higher education negatively affect whether a black individual will be
satisfied with his/her present job, but it also does not help in their initial job placement
in terms of job satisfaction nor does it aid their ability to transition to a new job that
they like better. The implication of these findings is that there appear to be negative
8

In this survey year the average age ranged from 24 to 32. The multinomial probit model was restricted
to only individuals who were 26 years of age or younger who are those individuals who are most likely
to still be in their first job and indeed are still at the beginning of their career.
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returns to education for black workers and that this is perhaps why they are choosing
lower levels of education than their white counterparts. The reason for this is still
unclear. It could be due to discrimination in the hiring process or in the workplace
once a person is hired, but it could also be due to a number of other factors such as
white works being able to take advantage of a wider professional network.

5. Conclusion
This paper attempted to determine whether there was a significant difference
in job satisfaction returns to education across races. In each model estimated it was
found that black workers with no education were more satisfied with their jobs than
their white counterparts, but that increasing levels of education diminished this effect
until it eventually became negative (at or before obtaining a high school diploma).
This negative relationship between education and job satisfaction for black workers is
consistent with the observed persistent educational attainment gap between black and
white individuals in a way that the monetary returns to education literature is not. If
we believe that higher expected job satisfaction is one of the motivators for pursuing
higher education and lower expected job satisfaction is one deterrent of pursuing
higher education then these results may lend some insight as to why we might still
observe a sizable gap in educational attainment.
We also established that while education has a positive impact on the ability to
transition into new work that is more satisfying for white workers, education actually
does not aid this transition ability for black workers. Further, higher levels of
education appear to increase the likelihood of having an initial job placement in a job
with lower levels of job satisfaction for black workers. This finding lends further
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support to the claim that lower expected gains in job satisfaction for black individuals
may be one of the driving forces behind why we observe a persistent educational
attainment gap between blacks and whites.
Now that it has been established in this paper that a significant difference in
the job satisfaction returns to education exists between black workers and white
workers until ability (which negatively affects job satisfaction) is accounted for, the
next logical step is to attempt to determine why this relationship exists. A further
study of the differences in different aspects of job satisfaction between black and
white workers could help to pinpoint where this negative effect of education and
ability for black workers is coming from. Do black workers get fewer fringe benefits
than white workers, is their work less interesting, do they work more hours, is there
some form of discrimination going on in the workplace? Knowing why black workers
are less happy on average with their work could tell us if there is anything that can be
done to close the job satisfaction gap. This in turn should at least diminish the gap in
education’s effects on job satisfaction and potentially decrease the educational
attainment gap in the long run.

92

References
Artz, Benjamin. “The Impact of Union Experience on Job Satisfaction.” Industrial
Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society Volume 49, Issue 3 (July 2010):
pp. 387-405
Ashraf, Javed. “Differences in Returns to Education: An Analysis by Race.”
American Journal of Economics and Sociology Volume 53, No. 3 (July 1994):
pp. 281-290.
Bartel, Ann P. “Race Differences in Job Satisfaction: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of
Human Resources Volume 16, No. 2 (Spring 1981): pp. 294-303.
Baxter, J. L. “Inflation in the Context of Relative Deprivation and Social Justice.”
Scottish Journal of Political Economy Volume 20, Issue 3 (November 1973):
pp. 263-282.

Baxter, J. L. Behavioral Foundations of Economics. London: Macmillan, 1993.
Belfield, Clive R., and Harris, R.D.F. “How well do theories of job matching explain
variations in job satisfaction across education levels? Evidence from UK
graduates.” Applied Economics Volume 34, (2002): pp. 535-548.
Belman, Dale, and Heywood, John. “Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education:
An Examination of Women and Minorities.” The Review of Economics and
Statistics Volume 73, No. 4 (November 1991): pp. 720-724.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 cohort, 1979-2002 (rounds 1-20) [computer file]. Produced and
distributed by the Center for Human Resource Research, The Ohio State
University. Columbus, OH: 2002.
Card, D. “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings.” Handbook of Labor
Economics Volume 3, Part 1 (1999): pp. 1801-1863. Elsevier B.V.
Clark, A. E. “Satisfaction and Comparison Income.” Journal of Public Economics
Volume 61, Issue 3 (September 1996): pp. 359-381.

93

Clark, A. E. “Job satisfaction and gender: Why are women so happy at work?”
Labour Economics Volume 4, Issue 4 (December 1997): pp. 341-372.
Clark, A., Oswald, A., and Warr, P. “Is Job Satisfaction U-Shaped in Age?” Journal
of Occupational and Organizational Psychology Volume 69, No. 1 (March
1996): pp. 57-8.

Digest of Education Statistics. Percentage of persons age 25 and over and 25 to 29, by
race/ethnicity, years of school completed, and sex: Selected years, 1910
through 2009. Table 8, (October 2009).
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d09/tables/dt09_008.asp
Fabra, M.E., and Camisón, Cesar. “Direct and indirect effects of education on job
satisfaction: a structural equation model for the Spanish case.” Economics of
Education Review Volume 28, (2009): pp. 600-610.
Florit, Eugenia F., and Lladosa, Luis E.V. “Evaluation of the Effects of Education on
Job Satisfaction: Independent Single-Equation vs. Structural Equation
Models.” International Advances in Economic Research Volume 13, (March
2007): pp. 157-170.
Glenn, Norval D., and Weaver, Charles N. “Further Evidence on Education and Job
Satisfaction.” Social Forces Volume 61, No. 1 (September 1982): pp. 46-55.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. “The Changing Distribution of Job Satisfaction.” Journal of
Human Resources Volume 36, No. 1 (Winter 2001): pp. 1-30.
Lang, Kevin, and Manove, Michael. “Education and Labor Market Discrimination.”
American Economic Review Volume 101, (June 2011): pp. 1467-1496.
Martin, Jack K., and Shehan, Constance L. “Education and Job Satisfaction: The
Influences of Gender, Wage-Earning Status, and Job Values.” Work and
Occupations Volume 16, No. 2 (May 1989): pp. 184-199.
Sloane, P. J., and Williams, H. “Job Satisfaction, Comparison Earnings, and Gender.”
Labour Volume 14, Issue 3 (September 2000): pp. 473-502.

94

Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Job Satisfaction
Binary Job Satisfaction
Job Satisfaction (No HS: 2,589 obs.)
Job Satisfaction (HS: 14,288 obs.)
Job Satisfaction (SC: 8,272 obs.)
Job Satisfaction (B: 5,589 obs.)
Job Satisfaction (G: 3,375 obs.)
Education
Education (JS = 0)
Education (JS = 1)
Hrs./Day
Health Insurance
Retirement Plan
Flexible Hours
Training
Union
Public Sector
Weeks Tenure
Log Income
Weeks Unemployed
AFQT score
Family Size
Married
Urban
N = 34,112
Proportion of Sample

White
3.349
(0.005)
0.456
(0.003)
0.423
(0.012)
0.420
(0.005)
0.474
(0.007)
0.465
(0.008)
0.560
(0.009)
13.640
(0.016)
13.460
(0.020)
13.854
(0.024)
8.519
(0.012)
0.823
(0.002)
0.675
(0.003)
0.521
(0.003)
0.561
(0.003)
0.136
(0.002)
0.201
(0.003)
266.756
(1.620)
10.180
(0.005)
1.211
(0.031)
57.545
(0.174)
2.922
(0.009)
0.645
(0.003)
0.730
(0.003)

Black
3.249
(0.007)
0.393
(0.005)
0.429
(0.017)
0.370
(0.007)
0.382
(0.009)
0.422
(0.014)
0.499
(0.020)
13.245
(0.020)
13.191
(0.025)
13.328
(0.035)
8.339
(0.016)
0.800
(0.004)
0.680
(0.005)
0.503
(0.005)
0.532
(0.005)
0.193
(0.004)
0.292
(0.004)
237.407
(2.343)
9.875
(0.009)
2.301
(0.070)
29.050
(0.222)
3.113
(0.166)
0.408
(0.005)
0.852
(0.003)

0.697

0.303

Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively.
Income is measured in constant 2000 dollars.

Difference
0.100***
(0.008)
0.063***
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.021)
0.050***
(0.009)
0.091***
(0.011)
0.043***
(0.016)
0.061***
(0.022)
0.395***
(0.027)
0.269***
(0.034)
0.526***
(0.045)
0.180***
(0.021)
0.023***
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.006)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.030***
(0.006)
-0.057***
(0.004)
-0.090***
(0.005)
29.348***
(2.904)
0.305***
(0.010)
-1.090***
(0.066)
28.495***
(0.301)
-0.191***
(0.018)
0.237***
(0.006)
-0.122***
(0.005)
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Table 3.2: Results of Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Baseline Models (No Racial Interactions)

Variable
Black
Education
Female
Age

(Model 1)
Marginal
Effect
-0.060***
(0.006)
0.014***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.003***
(0.001)

Personal Characteristics

(Model 2)
Marginal
Effect
-0.053***
(0.006)
0.014***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.003**
(0.001)


(Model 3)
Marginal
Effect
-0.056**
(0.006)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.038***
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.001)



Work Characteristics




Non-Monetary Characteristics
N=34,112
Predicted Prob.

(Model 4)
Marginal
Effect
-0.048***
(0.006)
-0.005***
(0.001)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.001)


0.437

0.437

0.436

0.434

Table 3.3: Results of Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Interacted Models

Variable
Black
Education
Black x Education
X2 test:
Race Variables
Education Variables
Female
Age

(Model 5)
Marginal
Effect
0.067*
(0.037)
0.016***
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.003)

(Model 6)
Marginal
Effect
0.080**
(0.037)
0.017***
(0.001)
-0.010***
(0.003)

(Model 7)
Marginal
Effect
0.093**
(0.037)
0.010***
(0.001)
-0.011***
(0.003)

(Model 8)
Marginal
Effect
0.111***
(0.038)
-0.002
(0.002))
-0.011***
(0.007)

116.48***
156.17***

87.13***
158.81***

96.65***
46.13***

74.65***
30.02***

0.026***
(0.005)
0.003***
(0.001)

0.026***
(0.005)
0.003**
(0.001)


0.039***
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.001)


0.016**
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.001)






Personal Characteristics
Work Characteristics



Non-Monetary Characteristics
Comparison Wage
N=34,112
Predicted Prob.

0.437

0.437

0.436

0.434
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Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively.
Year dummies indicating survey year also included in each model specification.
Income values are in constant 2000 dollars.

Table 3.4: Job Satisfaction Probit Regressions for Robustness Check Models (Model 9 is base model)
Model 9
Variable
Comparison Wage
Black
Education
Black x Education
Female
Female x Black
Female x Education
Female x Black x Education

Marginal
Effect
0.021***
(0.004)
0.121***
(0.038)
-1.40x10-4
(0.002)
-0.012***
(0.003)
0.009
(0.006)

(Model 9 with
No HS dropouts)
Marginal
Effect
0.024***
(0.004)
0.057
(0.045)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.008**
(0.003)
0.007
(0.007)

(Model 9 with
Female Interactions)
Marginal
Effect
0.023***
(0.004)
0.165***
(0.050)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.014***
(0.004)
0.100***
(0.040)
-0.141*
(0.070)
-0.005*
(0.003)
0.006
(0.006)

AFQT
Black x AFQT
Female x AFQT
Female x Black x AFQT

136.72***
16.85***
42.64***
58.91***
34,112
0.434
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X2 test:
Race Variables
81.97***
74.09***
112.82***
Education Variables
25.44***
6.34*
22.50***
Female Variables
N/A
N/A
35.26***
AFQT Variables
N/A
N/A
N/A
Number of Observations
34,112
31,523
34,112
Predicted Prob.
0.434
0.435
0.434
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively.
Year dummies indicating survey year also included in each model specification.
Income values are in constant 2000 dollars.

(Model 9 with
AFQT Interactions)
Marginal
Effect
0.021***
(0.004)
0.111**
(0.055)
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.010**
(0.005)
0.122***
(0.041)
-0.106
(0.077)
-0.009***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.001***
(2.16x10-4)
-0.001*
(4.31x10-4)
0.001*
(3.17x10-4)
4.40x10-4
(0.001)
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Table 3.5: Results of Cox Model of Proportional Hazards ("Failure" = Transitioning to New Job With
Higher Job Satisfaction)

Variable
Education
Black
Black x Education
Female

Hazard Ratio
1.042**
(0.020)
0.672
(0.742)
0.961***
(0.015)
0.557
(0.643)
1.001
(0.004)

Female x
Education
N=857
Log likelihood = -1528.7
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence
respectively.
Model is stratified by current job satisfaction score.
The model has been restricted to include only those with current job
satisfaction scores of 3 or below (those that actually can transition to better
jobs).
The full set of controls is used in estimating this model, but results are
omitted from the table.
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Table 3.6: Results of Multinomial Probit Model of Job Satisfaction at "Initial" Job
Variable
Black
Education
Black x Education

Job Satisfaction = 1
(Coefficient)
-1.070
(0.754)
0.032
(0.040)
0.090
(0.056)

Job Satisfaction = 2
(Coefficient)
-0.543
(0.521)
-0.014
(0.029)
0.078**
(0.039)

Job Satisfaction = 3
(Coefficient)
-0.337
(0.376)
-0.010
(0.020)
0.050*
(0.028)

N = 1353
Predicted Prob. (Black)
0.020
0.085
0.513
Predicted Prob. (White)
0.019
0.059
0.462
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence respectively.
The full set of controls is used in estimating this model, but results are omitted from the table.
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